

A
SUMME OF
MORALL
PHILOSOPHY
SVCCINCTLY
GATHERED, ELE-

gantly Composed,
and Methodically
handled,

BY

THAT LEARNED SCHOLLER
AND WORTHY DIVINE

WILLIAM PEMBLE M^r of

Arts and late Commoner
of *Mag. Hall.*

Mores honesta verbis, verba Moribus.

Τόπος ἔστι τοῦ τε λόγου πρότερος, ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον λόγου ἀλλοῦ
καὶ πῶς αὐτὸν ἀξιολογεῖται ἔχει

AT OXFORD.


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
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To the Reader.

BEhold (unpartiall and courteous) reader, I present vnto thee one whom I need not name the whole booke so fully speaks him, it being the character of him, whose name the Frontispee beares: here he yet liues although dead, for the booke breathes that which he once was & when he was, he liued that which the booke teacheth, for such was his admirable composure, that his very actions were a morall Lecture, hauing exactly learned that of Minutius, non loqui Magnated viuere. I will not make any elogy of the Author, nor encomium on the booke, when as the one deserves rather the registering in annales, then the light torch of a running pen; for the other vnlesse my guesse fayle me to a Iudicious braine, and a well seasoned heart, it will commend it selfe, it having a mixture of learning & delight, whereby it will both instruct and please the reader, and to say truth such was his dexterity, that by rhetoricke he could insinuate to a perswasio, & by solidity of argument euince thee to assent. But if perhaps the booke in all points answer not the worth of the Man, or thy expectation, let it not detract from his deserts, or beget a preiudice in thy conceipt, since the worke is Posthumus, and (I am perswaded) neuer by the author intended for the publique censure; neyther is the Printer much to be blamed, since he is so carefull to preserve any of thy blest reliques (Pemble) yet vnslaine, from the unhappy fate of the urne. Lastly since to offend is humanae sortis, whatsoeuer errors thou mayst find either in Author or Printer, the one thou mayest in thy Iudgement correct; the other in humanity condone. So mayest thou in some sort vindicate the Author, and gratifie the Printer. Farewell.



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A SUMME OF Morall Phylosophy.

I. Ethickes.

Morality is the Art of behaviour, prescribing directions for manners arising out of use and customary conversation.

Manners are either { 1 Reall, making a good man ἀγαθός.
2 Complementall, making a faire condition-d man εὐαδής.

The Vertues arising out of both καλοκαγαθία { 1 Time.
Goodnesse is Positiue. Complement varies { 2 Place.
according to { 3 Person.

The one necessary, the other indifferent, it vsed there is a grace and ornament, if not the impeach is not great.

Goodnesse is wrought by actions of Vertue.

Naturall for men to worke: or life tearmed by the *Pythagoreans* *ἀνθρώπων ἀρετή*, a fardle of Actions: Beasts are dull and at command, *ἀγνύνται* *non agunt*: men only are Actiue, as

hauing { Wit for Iudging.
{ Will for prosecuting.

Actions are to be { Vertue for directions.
perfected by { Fortune for successe.

Vertue is lame without Fortune, and Fortune blinde, heady and headlesse without vertue

The Summe of

Our working is either {

- 1 In a state Politicke.
- 2 In a family Oeconomick.
- 3 In private touching our selues only Ethicke.

In Ethicks are foure causes of Actions.

1 The Finall, the vtmost is felicity, the speciall and immediate end, any particular good being in shew or substance good.

2 The Formall {

- Vertues } making
- as { Vices } our { Bonum { Verum.
- { Good { Appareus.
- { Bad.

3 Materiall, as Passions, whereon our vertues must worke.

4 Efficient {

- Wit that makes prudence.
- as { Will that makes praeflection.

This is your Subiect of all Ethicks.

I I. Of Particular Ends.

NO Action so suddaine, but proposeth some end: As actions are sundry, so are particular ends: Our appetite affects them as either in shew or substance good.

Omnia appetunt Bonum.

Desire naturally is for preservation; Evil as it is evil is anemie to being: Hence the ayme of all Appetite must bee some good

Appetites are either {

- 1 Naturall, as common Inclinations to a generall good of being: as for the Earth to beare downewards, the fire vpwards,
- 2 Sensitiue called *appetitus sensitivus*, whose illues are, to {
 - 1 Griefe for things to be avoided.
 - 2 Pleasure for things to be prosecuted.
- 3 Rationall, partly from the Vnderstanding, that iudges the good: partly from the will that affects it: this is in men only, the other in beasts.

Hence

Hence ariseth
three sorts of
Good, viz.

- 1 Bonum Entis : The object proper to the naturall.
- 2 Bonum sensus: Whose satisfactiō is delight.
- 3 Bonum Moris: Whose manager is Reason.

If reason be gouernesse, we apprehend true good.

If lead by Passion, we follow appearances.

Passion sets a colour on Evill, & perswades the good of it.

Hence are all vitious desires.

Our way for such objects is with *Annibal* to beare the
guided pillars in *Iuno's* Temple, before we venter to feast on
them. Cic. 1. Divin.

--- *Veri speciem dignoscere calle*

Ne qua sub arato mendosum timeat auro.

Things are
desired, ei-
ther as

- 1 Vsefull only to others, not for themselves, so riches in themselves are nothing, but are desired for use only.
- 2 Vsefull both for others, & desirable in themselves: so Virtues of themselves are comely, and are as means to happiness.
- 3 Desirable only for themselves, not for others as felicity the last good, *τ'αγαθόν, finis finium.*

That we often sayle of the end intended, is for the want of

- 1 Iudgement in choice of the right means.
- 2 Ability in not prosecuting that we haue chosen.
- 3 Constancie in not persevering in what wee haue chosen, and began to prosecute.

The excellency of one end above another is knowne,

1 If that end haue the most worthy means directing to it
Hence the end of Policy is above others as hauing the means of other Practick ends subalternate to it.

2 If it comprehend the speciall end intended by actions of lesse worth, as the art of Horse-man-shippe is referred to art Military.

Hence the end of one is more excellent then the other.

Felicity is the best of ends: our soule affecteth it: Vertues

worke it: Constancy in goodnesse perfects it: It selfe is the vp. shot of all practicke ends.

III. *Of Uniuersall Ends.*

Felicity.

Felicity is the proposall of the best good.

We propose our good either as informed by passion or judgement: Passion goes by opinion, an as opinion is staggering, so must such proposals be. Hence, to some pleasure, to others wealth, to others honour is Felicity; all are pleasures for the time, but content not.

This Felicity is not true, but forged.

True felicity is from an vprightnesse of judgement.

That we may finde it out, seeke we what in a man can be

Of {
1 Greatest perfection.
2 Sole sufficiencie.
3 Quietnesse of minde.

1 Perfection is required to all goods, but the height of perfection to the best goods.

2	Sole sufficiency that there be	{	1 Contentation in what we enioy	{	This keeps vs from re- pining.		
			2 No want of what wee enioy not				
3	Quiet of mind that there bee	{	1 Integrity towards God.	{	But vsing them al- waies as helps not as ends.		
			2 True dealing with men				
			3 Not doting on the goods of			{	Body or fortune
			4 Stopping extravagancy of passions.				

A breach in any of these marres tranquillity.

In a man we consider a double carriage,

either as {
1 Liuing in this life only Morall.
2 Preparing himselfe for a future life, Christian.
Hence

Hence Stoicks and Platonickes held, we were free of
two Cit-
ties { 1 The greater, -- Heaven.
 { 2 The lesser, -- The World.

This world as it beares the image of the Heauenly, and is
the way of our iourning thither : So the actions of the one
truely morall, are not in opposition to the Christian

Each of these { 1 Greatest perfection.
liues haue in { 2 Sole sufficiency.
their end { 3 Truest quietnesse of minde.

The felicity of the one is presence of all good , when the
soule is separated.

The meanes to get this generall is Religion.

The felicity of the other is presence of all good , whilst
we liue.

The meanes to get it , is common honestie , or vniversal
justice.

Liuing in this world our { Soule only.
worke is either in { Soule and Body.

The worke of our soule only is immanent.

The perfection of it is contemplation.

The obiect and ayme of it is Truth.

The satisfaction is content and quietnesse of minde.

The meanes to attaine it, is Sapience and Pondering.

That is an habit generally wrought by

two particulars { 1 Vnderstanding for conceit , and appre-
 { hension of principles.
 { 2 Science for inference of conclusions.

This true fe- { 1 True perfection, { is tearmed *Felicitas*
licity, sith in { 2 Sole sufficiencie, { *contemplatiua*.
it is { 3 Quietnesse of mind

Our worke both in Soule and Body is transient, so called
because the action of the soule were secret were it not , that
the spreading of the body displaied it: The operations of the
soule properly are punctuall and indiuisible: As they partake
of the body, so they open themselves both to the view , and
vie of others: Hence arise actions of practise , their speciall

Homo animal
politicum.

ayme is the good of others, and sith we are not for our selues only, but to be vsfull to others, & society arises out of community of nature our speciall felicity, for vs must bee practicke.

Felicitas Practica.

There are two speciall Felicities then.

As sinne and vice being in all a double misery

{	1	Darknesse of vnderstanding for discerning truth.
	2	Depravation of will for affecting goodnesse.

So to remedy these our perfection must be

{	Contemplative for the one.
	Practicke for the other.

These come not of the strength of men, sith the blind cannot iudge of colours, the perverse cannot will goodnesse.

They are giuen of God, if any gift comes from aboue to man, saith Aristotle; *Ευλογον εἰ τὰς εὐδαιμονίας ἀόριστον ἔστι.*

It is most fit it should bee our felicity, *ἡ ἀρετὴ μάλιστα, ἡ καὶ θεοῦ μάλιστα.*

The sterne to manage these must be faith.

Without it

{	Contemplation is curiosity.	{	This is the aime of the heathen goodnesse,
	Good actions but fashion, & vaine-glory		

With it

{	Contemplation is wisdom.	{	This alone is mans felicity.
	Action is		{
	1 Duty to God. 2 Charity to our neighbour 3 Salvation to our selues.		

IV. *Temporall happinesse described.*

Felicitas est
Actio.

The perfection of things is in their operation. Idlenesse, and want of Action proceeding from Impotency: Hence Felicity being the perfection of man is action.

To will and intend suffices not, but doing is requisite,

In masteries the crownes are not given to the likeliest in person, but to the best in performance. *Arist. Ethic. 1. c. 8.*

Action

Actions is a power common to all; communities commend not, such commendation aymes at a speciall, and preferring before others: Thence Felicity the highest of goods must be a speciall action of man, that proceeds from the soule not as it is vegetatiue, and sensitiue (so agreeing with Beasts and Plants) but as it is rationall, only proper to man.

Animi.

In the reasonable Soule we consider two parts, the one } Governing.
the other } Governed.

Secundum
Virtutem.

The governing part } Wit,
is by } Will regulating our soules actions, and
stopping their vnwarrantable ex-
currence: This called *Recta Ratio*, or
Virtus.

The part to be governed is the seat of Passions.

Though they naturally sprout from the stemme of reason, and are proper to men only, yet in themselves they are wild and vniuely, but strength of reason must order them,

Our perfection } in the latter which must obey.

is not } but in the former, which must gouerne.

Reasons in strength and actions of Vertue are nothing, vnlesse they are continued: Perfection of good must bee without Ruptures: The intercedents of an after euill marres the glory of the precedent good actions: Hence felicity must be a worke of honesty to the end of our daies.

In vita pacis.
ita.

This felicity ends with our life, and therefore temporall.
The other beginnes after death, and is eterna'l.

V. Things required to temporall Happiness.

Happiness is a Vertue common not for our selues only, but for the good of others.

An happy mans employement must be beneficence: his reward esteeme and credit among the people.

That he may be best in perfor-

mance, and highest repute, } Minde.
he must haue the goods of } Body.
} Fortune.

Triabonorum
genera requi-
runtur ad fe-
licitatem.

The mind as most inward, so affordeth goods most proper to felicity; A man for morall goodnesse is to be iudged for the goods within: Things outward as of the Body and Fortune are often changeable. They are not ouermuch to bee desired, yet if offered they are to be receaued; we take them for continency, not necessity, as viefull to set forth our Vertues both to the good and view of others.

Riches and the goods of Fortune serue for the weale of the body, the body for the soule, the soule for God. *ἡ ψυχή ἐξ ἑαυτῆς τὸ σῶμα, διὰ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν.*

Thus the goods outward are in direction to the goods inward: they make not a man happy, but adorne him; they giue his luster, not his being.

The thing that makes happinesse properly and principally is vertue; yet Fortune must grace it; as the Stones & Timber make the house, yet for sight we could wish it pargetted, before we dwell in it: And though a man can foot it well, yet he need not refuse a Coach if offer be made. *Seneca.*

Vertue without Fortune is like a King that hath a sure Counsell, though his vnderlings be rebellious; Hee is able to keepe him in guard, though abroad there be mutinies; Hee may bee happy in himselfe in despite of Fortune: like as a strong man can beare, if a greater weight should be laid vpon him, and can suffer cold, though in the interim his teeth chatter.

An happy man vieth ill fortune, as a good Captaine bad armes, though vnframable, yet vsing them according to art military, or as a skilfull craftzman shewing his art on a shooc of bad leather, both may doe well, but better, if their meanes were better.

The goods of the mind are either

- 1 Wit for iudging.
- 2 Will for choosing, what we haue iudged.
- 3 Power for prosecuting what we haue chosen.
- 4 Ability for ordering our Prosecutions.

Habits are the lowest gifts of the minde.

1 They are gotten by vie and custome, the other art natural.

2 They

Morall Philosophy.

2

2 They worke on passions, whose grounds is sense.

The other are with-
out sense, sith

1	Prosecution	} are inseparate sub- stances-
2	Choice.	
3	Iudgement	
4	Power	
5	Wit.	
6	Will.	

Habits are only for the corporall.

Their kinds
are

{	Intellectuall,
	Morall.

The intellectuall, some
by doctrine, & instinc-
tion, and are 5, to wit,

1	Understanding	} for contéplatio
2	Science	
3	Sapience.	} for action,
4	Prudence.	
5	Arte	

The morall come by
vie, and custome, viz.

{	If ruling passion, it is Vertue.
	If ruled by it, it is Vice.

Their properties are

1	To be begotten by vs.
2	Being gotten long to continue with vs.

Qualitas acquisita difficilius mobilis.

The difference betwixt the worke of nature, and of man-
ners is, Nature first begins with the habit, then comes to the
action, as first we haue the power of laughing, before the act:
Manners are first in action, then in habit.

The goods of the Body are

1	Health.
2	Strength.
3	Grace of person.

Though Vertue could appeare in deformity, yet it is more
honourable in a comely personage; as the Ruby planted in
Iron hath his luster, yet it sparkles more in a bed of Gold.

The goods of fortune are

1	Wealth.
2	Worth of birth.
3	Reputation and credit.
4	Friends.
5	Goods of Posterity.

B

1 Goods

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 2 Goodseither in } Money.
 } Goods.
 } Lands.

The vse and end } 1 For necessity principall.
 } 2 Then for } 1 Not of pampering.
 } pleasure } 2 But of recreation.

It is requisite for pourveiance: Poverty and Want are re-
 pining: necessity of hauing armeth to Importunity and im-
 pudenty in procuring: Thence the beggers life, though most
 to be pittied for want, yet deserues least fauour for their
 boldnesse. The *Pythagoreans* would haue an happy man
 wealthy, but not in abundance: That much prosperity is like
 over-much light, it quells the eye-sight. That wee must wish
 for no more prosperity, then may fit vs for action, as the Pi-
 lot takes not the shippe of most weight, but of most conueni-
 ence for coasting: That the evils of much prosperity are
 greater, then they of aduersity; as in the body superfluities
 worke more dangerous diseases, then defects: That as affliction
 compells our minde; so height of wealth puffs it vp, and
 empties it: Hence we see the rich often iniurious and in-
 croaching: A happy man by wisdom prevents these.

2 Worth of birth, this is requisite, that there be no staine of
 blood. Low birth defects the minde.

Bastardy is dishonourable, as debarring inheritance to the
 common rites of a Citizen.

Lewdnesse of parents is a disparagement to the child, as
Diogenes seeing a boy wantonly giuen, gaue this the reason
 of it, that surely his father was drunken, when he begot him:
 Contrarily it was *Diophantes* brag, that he could preuaile in
 any demand with the *Athenians*, with his father *Themistocles*
 could doe so before him.

3 Reputation } Height of place, as preferments.
 is either *viz.* in } Good opinion of our fellow Cittizens.

1 Preferments are properly due to the best: Lewd gouer-
 nours come in rather by intencion then right: *Optimates* is
 an attribute to those, that for the common good so carry the-
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selues, that *Sua consilia optimo cuiq; debentur*: They are defined by Tully, *Optimates sunt, qui nec nocentes sunt, nec natura improbi, nec furiosi, nec malis domesticis impediti*: Hence hee ranges even rusticks and trades-men, so they be honest. Cicero pro Sextio,

The reason may be, the ground of evill society must be religion, and justice; without it can neither bee restraint from injuries, nor punishment of evill doers, nor reward for the well deseruing. Wealth and Power make a Society spracke, and passable, but iustice informes, and acts it: This is as the soule to quicken it, that as the Organe to vent and spread it: Hence the right of gouernance principally is due to the best in life.

2 Good opinion in the minds of others is proper to the Vertuous.

It opens it { Words } offer.
felse in { Works } vice.

Three things breed in a man credit { Wiidome.
Honesty.
Loue and kindnesse. } Arista, Rhet.

The speciall of these is Honesty: for a man truly honest hath that wiidome, that he can distinguish the good from the bad; to follow the one and avoid the other: and his loue is such, that he will labour to benefit all, and iniurie none: This repute for good actions common and ordinary opens it selfe into praise for actions extraordinary, into honour, glory and admiring: honour and admiration ascends vpward, and is the title due to the extreame point of goodnesse: We yeeld it to things of most distance, & farthest out of our compasse: Hence all things most admired are most perfect: for the persons most admiring are of the lowest condition; therefore *Pythagoras* boasted he had got his good by Philosophy, that he had learned to wonder at nothing, sith admiration proceeds rather out of the gaze of ignorance, then from a true view of iudgement.

As in Nature there is excesse and defect, as in monsters, so in manners also.

Things honoured and admired are out of the reach of Envy.

In vicina versamur invidia, simplicium longe posita miramur

Hence good cannot be envied, since Envy is not at lower perfections: Praise is a title due to vertue, and is the reward of it; we attribute it not simply, but in comparison; nor is a man so much praised for his absolute good, as because in that good he exceeds others, that are in comparison worse then himselfe. Hence praise stands in a proportionate preferring before others: *Non ut optimis par sit, sed ut malis melior.*

Glory is simply without reference to defects of others: it admits no proportion by reason of distance: praise may bee given and taken of equalls: Glory is for a superiour onely; praise recants downe-wards to conferre with defects, and after conference to extoll the better deserts of the other: Glory admits not of comparing, but is a title absolute.

Hence *Felicitas* } *Honorabile.*

bonum } *Non laudabile.*

4 Goods of po- } Children } somewhat to be respected of
sterity as of } Kindred } as a happy man.

It followes him after death as a complement of his glory, yet so that it nothing detracts from him, if the contrary happen.

5 Friends are requisite } Use.
to happineffe partly for } Comfort.

1 For use, sith a man cannot rely vpon the purchase of his owne hands only, but he often requires an helpe: Management of things are sundry, and sith they must each haue their severall dispatch, they cannot so well be compassed by one.

2 For comfort, sith a man is pliable to vtter himselfe to some one of trust: Troubles are incident to all; and there is ease in revealing them. --- *Strangulat inclusus dolor.* Againe our nature abandoneth solitarineffe: Presence of friends keepes vs from feeding on our owne hearts, like *Bellepheron* in the wilderness.

Ipse solum cor edens hominum vestigia vivit.

To friendship three things are required. { 1 *Virtus, vt pulchrum.*
2 *Consuetudo, vt iucundum.*
3 *Usus, vt necessarium.*

Virtue the ground, that must begin it.

Pleasure, and conversation, that continue it.

Use and helpe, that must shew, vtter and exercise it.

As it is the prop. and stay of mans life, and followes immediately from the sociableness of his nature, so it relies on three goods

The end of all appetites { *Bonum honestum.*
Bonum utile.
Bonum iucundum.

Friends must suddenly gotten.
not be many in multitude.

1 Suddaine friends haue but small root of loue.

It was *Zenxis* answer when hee was reprehended for sloe painting, that hee must bestowe time in drawing those lines, which he hoped should continue for ever. Obseruance of their passions and qualities must preceede, before we enter to close with them.

1 Whether they be agreeable in manners to vs.

2 Whether they inroach not too fast into our acquaintance, for towardness of this is an occasion of suspect: for such a one is either a common friend and so lesse intire, or he comes to you but for advantage and so for advantage will betray you.

2 Multitude of friends empties affection, as the channell must haue many shallows, that is cut into sundry streames. One bragged to *Chilo*, that he knewe not many his enemies: he replied that by that he knewe not many was his friends. Friendship is a tenure precise, and proper to one, not to bee enlarged to multitudes: *Agefilaus* would vse all in courtesie, but he was familiar and friendly but to few.

The Giant that had 50 bellies, was faine to haue an 100 hands, and had by this no more benefit of sustenance, then they that to one belly haue but two hands. *Amicitia tantum inter duos.*

Men of worth haue many fellowes, few friends.

Friendship is when they follow principally for Vertue.

When they follow } Countenance.

for goods outward } Power.

1 Courtenance: It is greatnesse of retinue vsfull to men of place. *In pace decus, in bello praesidium.*

2 Power: It is faction, and by it they raise themselves, depresse their adversaries. In gouernment it is good to vse men of one ranke equally: for to countenance some extraordinarily is to make them insolent, and the rest discontent. In fauour it is best to vse men with much difference, and election for it makes the persons preferred more careful, and the rest more officious.

VI. The Stoicks tenent of Happinesse.

Happinesse being the perfection of man must bee in things that most honour him, nothing so worthy of him as vertue. It proceeds immediatly from his soule, as pertaining both of wit and will.

Hence as beasts are devoid of both these, so they cannot be styled } Vertuous.
Happy.

To liue according to vertue, and the prescript of nature is accounted all one. The Reasons are three.

1 Nature is the finger of God in creatures, whose worke is for the best, and vertue is naught but the perfection of God.

2 Man by nature an image of God, as Vertue and Goodnesse flowes immediatly from the one, so ought from the other.

3 Our soule hath will and wit: Wit the apprehender of Truth, and will of Good: the conioyning of both is mans nature, which of it selfe must both iudge and affect true good: this only is vertue. Vertue is tearmed by them any speciall action proper to any speciall nature: Heavens, Elements, and dead bodies are by nature actiue, and vertuous: As things are

are most materiall, so are they lesse quicke: Hence soules are most vertuous, and this vertue is their felicitie.

VII. Of Passions in generall.

Passions are the matter of Vertue.

Materia Vir-

They are the nailes, that fasten soule and body together.

In them we note their

- 1 Rising and increase.
- 2 Issues and consequence.
- 3 Prevention and stopping.

Their rising partly from

- 1 The soules nature.
- 2 The occurrences of obiects.

The soule growes in passion

- 1 Not by the vnderstanding part.
- 2 But by the sensitiue part, which
- 1 Iudgeth a Truth.
- 2 Induceth a colour of Truth.

The sensitiue works for passion

- 1 Abroad by the five outward senses.
- 2 Within by the imagination or fancy.

The worke of the phantasie is to resume what the memory hath retained, and the common sense iudged, and out of them to make collections of appearances.

These appearances goe masked vnder the habit of

- 1 Truth.
- 2 Good.

If of truth, they perswade a weak vnderstanding & so breed, viz.

- 1 Curiosity
- 2 Folly
- 3 Giddines

and hence are

- 1 Hereticks.
- 2 Poets
- 3 Fond students.

these erre in the Theory.

If of good they perswade a weake will, and breed some passions, which make men vicious and erre in the practise: That which makes a fancy ventrous & resolute in these collections, is opinion proceeding naturally from the soule, and as phantasie is a part of it, so opinion must be the issue of it.

Hence arise the tenents against the Stoickes.

1 Passions are a naturall part of the soule.

2 They may be moderated well from their excurrance, but cannot be throughly barred of their existence in vs.

3 They

3 They are not in themselves evill, but in their degrees.
 4 They are often profitable, and meanes to further vertue,
 as feare teaches vs to avoid evill, selfe-loue to prosecute our
 good. Mercy and pittie teaches a King: Clemency and anger
 wheteth our valour.

5 Their excesse is not positiuely evill, but vpon circumstan-
 ces, as with my friend I may be angry for his fault, but bee
 reconciled againe: with my foe I may be more implacable.

6 Though strengthened by opinion, yet not proceeding
 from without vs, but naturall apprehensions within.

7 In a man { Vnderstanding } both in reluctance to the
 two parts { Sense } other.

1 Vnderstanding takes the good of most worth for honestie.

Hence ariseth conscience, or *conſciencia*.

2 Sense takes the { Pleasure. } hence are
 good of most { Profit } passions.
 The will hath two inclinations { Reason, or
 to follow, either } Sense.

In iudgement we often condemne, what in passion wee
 prosecute.

--- *Video meliora, probog.*

Deteriora sequor.---

objects that moue { Evills to be avoided.
 our phantasie are } Goods to be followed.

The ground that perswades our soule to apprehend these
 objects, is selfe-loue.

This as { 1 Ruled by reason is good: and the duty of man.
 it is } 2 Ruled by Sense is bad: and nurseth passions.

It may be defined, --- An inordinate inclination of the affe-
 cting too much pleasure of the body against the prescript of
 right Reason.

The issues of { Generall.
 passions are } Speciall,

1 The Generall are.

1 Rebellion against reason.

2 Division

- 2 Division in themselves.
- 3 Insatiable in their extent.
- 4 Importunate for action. Hence they worke headinesse, and suddaine resolution.

5 Desirous of things $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 1 \text{ Foolish.} \\ 2 \text{ Inconvenient.} \\ 3 \text{ Impossible.} \end{array} \right\}$

6 Inconstancy of prosecution.

2 The speciall are. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 1 \text{ Raising the humors.} \\ 2 \text{ Altering the Complexion.} \\ 3 \text{ Forcing new motions.} \end{array} \right\}$

1 Driuing the body to distemper by

As in feare the blood chilleth, in anger boyles, in griefe the heart closeth, in ioy opens.

2 Blinding the Iudgement; The Reason is,

The Vnderstanding receiues her notice from the fancies impression: which betriending Passion representeth often to the Iudgement not true and reall, but apparent and conceited shapes.

3 Perverting our will.

The will inclineth oftner to passion, then Iudgement, because passion is giuen more to choice and liberty.

The Iudgement is precise and settled to one part.

The prevention of passions is to $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Discover} \\ \text{Temper} \end{array} \right\}$ them

1 Discouery is had,

2 From the vse of company; as Augustus judged of his two daughters *Julia* and *Livia*, finding one delighted to converse with graue men, the other with yongsters; pronounced the one staid, the other light.

2 From the view of complections; as the Cholericke breeds anger; the sanguine pleasure, slegme, sloth; melancholy, sadnesse.

3 From the vse of talke. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 1 \text{ Suddaine.} \\ 2 \text{ Often.} \\ 3 \text{ Personally impeaching.} \\ 4 \text{ Censuring.} \end{array} \right\}$

as if it be

C

TO

2 To discouer our selues obserue we what our enemies speake of vs. they are ready to seize on what is faulty in vs, when our selues are blinded with selfe-loue.

After the discouery our Passions must be tempered.

The temper of them must be reason, and wisdom check-
ing the sence, and stopping the Excurrance of Phantasie.

Men by reason teach birds to speake, dogs to hunt, horses to curueat, though sence perswade the contrary.

And we discharge our selues of the meat wee haue eaten with pleasure, when we heare it was polluted or forbidden.

The way to temper them is not to roote out but to prune them, as the taming of Horses is not to take away their motion, but their skips: and *Lycorgus* should not so much cut downe the vines to barre drunkenesse, as haue planted cisterns of water to haue allayed the heat thereof. It was *Zeno* his saying of muscall instruments, that euen barren wood & dead guts would speake, if strained to their pitch, and ranked in order.

Wisedome must be our Astrolabe to take the height and elevation of our passions, if they ouer-grow.

Our waies to slacke them are,

1 To bend to the other extreame; as if my sight be scattered by view of white, I must regather it by viewing a black object: And *Epaminandas* way to stop his surfet on sweet meats, was to close his banquet with a draught of Vineger.

2 Abstinence from things hurtfull, though lawfull.

3 Stop all occasions, that are motiues to set passion on head.

4 Barre selfe conceits, and fancifull apprehensions.

5 Yeeld not to inconstancy and fleeting.

6 Labour to mortifie the Flesh.

If passion be too violent, that we cannot slack it, our labour must be,

1 To stay execution; As *Archytas* professed to his baylife that carelesly kept his ground, that were he not angry, hee would tell him part of his minde: And *Plato* would not himselfe

felſe beat his man, while he was moued, but gaue him vp
to *Spensippu* to be handled by him.

2 To conceale it in what we may; for it breeds disrespect, if wee open our yeelding to it: this made *Plutarch* to be vbraided by his servant, when he could not dissemble his anger that it was a shame for him to be angry, sith he had written a booke to the contrary.

A man (saith *Plato*) is sometimes his owne lord, when reason rules him; sometimes his owne vassall, when sense and passion.

VIII *The division and number of Passions.*

The bent and aime of all
passions are either,

{	The gaining of a good:
}	The avoidance of evill.

Good & evil { are { gained { by 2 inclinations
& avoided { of the soule

1 The concupiscible that affects.
2 The irascible that persecuts & ventures on what we affect.

Both these have their objects } Good.
} Evill.

The attainment of the { Good breeds pleasure.
Evill breeds griefe.

Thence {Pleasure }
 {Grief } are the heads of all passion.

The passions aiming at good are either

1	Loue.
2	Desire.
3	Hope.
4	Boldnesse.
5	Pleasure.

The good presented { Loue } these proceed from the concu-
is affected first by { Desire } piscible,

The passions that worke $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{In thought only.} \\ \text{Or in deed.} \end{array} \right.$
against another either

1 In thought, 1.

5 Jealousy or suspicion mixt with $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Griefe.} \\ \text{Anger.} \\ \text{Feare.} \\ \text{Hate.} \end{array} \right.$

2 In deed, 2.

6 Anger mixt $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 1 \text{ Griefe for wrongs.} \\ 2 \text{ Hate against the party wronging.} \\ 3 \text{ Desire of revenge.} \\ 4 \text{ Boldnetie in venturing.} \end{array} \right.$
with either

7 Maligning: this is different from anger, sith anger is
moued vpon wrong done: This without that motiue: only
because it is well with another.

This containes $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Envy muttering at anothers good.} \\ \text{Εὐχάριστα, ioying at others fall.} \end{array} \right.$

The former mixt of $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Hate} \\ \text{Griefe.} \\ \text{Desire of falling.} \end{array} \right.$

The latter of $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Hate.} \\ \text{Ioy for the Evill fallen.} \end{array} \right.$

This of Passions in generall.

IX Of loue the first Passion.

The object of Loue is goodnesse; the issue ioy and con- Obiectum.
tent.

It is either with or without passion.

1 Without Passion $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{God} \\ \text{Angells} \end{array} \right. \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{both haue wills which are} \\ \text{the affectors of good and} \\ \text{this affecting is Loue.} \end{array} \right.$
it's in

1 Gods loue is partly in $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Reflexe to himselfe.} \\ \text{Communicating good to others,} \\ \text{viz. the creatures.} \end{array} \right.$

1 By reflex into himselfe, he views his owne goodnesse: & goodnesse is the Loadstone of Loue.

2 He communicates to { Nature.
creatures goods of { Grace.

1 Nature is generally of Creation } In this is the true
all, & comprehends } Preservation } *Bonum Entis*, which
the Workes of } temporall. } God loves.

2 Grace is special to
 some and compre- } Redemption } In this is the true
 hends the spiritual } Satisfaction } *bonum mors*, and
 acts of his love as } Glorification } this is Gods love.

2 Angells loue is by con- } God.
templation of } the Workes of God.

They see in all perfection of good, the fountaine is God, the streames scatter into each part of the world: things they cannot hate, only sinne they hate, which is as nothing.

This loue hath these tenants.

It is in the best natures, and the perfection of them.

2 As the best things are most lovely, so they are most in imparting their loves to others.

3 It is Impotence to bee hating, envying, murmuring, all which are opposite to Love.

4 It cannot be perfect in man, it is truest in God, & nature; these are not interrupted by Passions.

5 The bond of matrimonic hath not truely this loue, fith
it is spiced with lust: we may rather terme it the Union of af-
fections willed by God for Avoidance of further evill.

6 It works for the best things with reluctance to sense.

2 Love with Passion is either } Proper
 } Improper.

1 Loue improper is in beasts, ~~very~~^{very} in the Emperesse of Na-
ture.

Birds build their neasts, and spare their owne crawes to fill their young ones; the Partridge flags before the Faukner, and ventures the taking, that her young ones may escape. The most timorous creatures grow most resolute in these combats.

combats: In the worst natures are some sparkles of loue: As in Gold-mines amongst much earth shines a luster, and in beast are rude lines of mans naturall affection; As in wild figs and oliues are the spices of the sweete, though in harther manner:

2 Loue proper is in men alone.

It is either of $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{our selues.} \\ \text{or others.} \end{array} \right.$

1 Loue of our selues called $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 1 \text{ True according to reason,} \\ \text{or} \\ 2 \text{ Fancied according to Sense.} \end{array} \right.$
φιλαυδία either

1 True selfe-loue apprehends that which is simply good, both in present and future.

It respects the goods of the soule before those of the Body.

It chooseth the lesse good of most durance before the greatest good of lesse continuance.

It is the Well-head of Charitie.

---(*Charitas incipit a seipso.*)

And the spurre of Vertue, sith by it we benefit our selues.

2 The propertyes of it are $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Wishing} \\ \text{Working} \end{array} \right\}$ the best to our selues.

3 Consent with our owne $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Reason.} \\ \text{Passion.} \end{array} \right.$
parts, as of

4 Louing to retire into our owne thoughts.

5 Ioying at our owne good, and grieuing at the contrary.
Hence it is the attribute only of good men.

2 The euill follow shewes, and opinatiue good, which failing breeds sorrow: the good man aimes at truth, and therein contents himselfe.

2 Conscience suffers not the euill to view their owne thoughts, they are at oddes with themselves; Sense and Reason are hard at combat with them: Loue cannot be there, where there is difference.

3 Selfe-loue causeth Ioy; Euill men, though they haue ioy of sense, they haue griefe of Reason, and their ioy is not for durance, but ends in Repentance.

4 Intemperance is the badge of Evill men, whose worke is to breed diseases in } Soule.
 } Body.

A good man so loves himselfe, that he will either stop rayning or labour there allaying.

5 As goodnesse is wisdom, so Evill is Folly, which blindeth vs. that wee cannot distinguish the good from the Evill, but choose at randome, and so proue our selues without selfe-love.

The opposite of selfe love is either a stupid neglect, or a desperate hate of himselfe, they that mangle themselves, are of this ranke: Selfe-love fancyed according to sense is the badge of Fooles; It is the seed-plot of Passion, the bathe of Flatterers, the nurse of vices in manners reall, of phantasticke humors, in manners of Complement.

It ariseth from } 1 Blindnesse of vnderstanding.
 } 2 Easynesse of comparing our selues with o-
 3 heads, viz. } thers.
 } 3 Partiallity in iudging to our owne side.
 The Issues of it are 4.

- 1 Admiration of our selues.
- 2 Arrogancy of Speech.
- 3 Easy excusing our owne faults.
- 4 Despising of others admonition, and couniell.

The waies to restraints it are.

1 Praise the Act of any about thine owne particular, as many eyes see more then one, and many hands make better ridance.

2 Amplifie others vertues depressing thine owne.

3 Besparing in Vauntes, seldome in excuses.

This selfe-love barres the admittance of goodnesse; it comes not, vnlesse it be taught. sought it cannot be, vnlesse it be acknowledged wanting; Selfe-love barres this acknowledgement.

*Muli ad solidam eruditionem pervenissent
 Nisi se pervenisse tam putassent.*

Loue

Loue to others is directed either to } God,
or
our Neighbours.

1 Loue to God is only in a sanctified will none can truly hate him but sinners: The reason is because, God is Loue, and sinne is in opposition to God.

2 Loue to our Neighbours is either to } Enimyes
or
Freinds.

1 Loue to our Enimies is one of the cunning'st Poynts of *Charity*, and an imitation of the divine nature.

1 Pardoning them, if they repent, as the Lions doe the beasts, that submit them selves.

2 Pardoning them, though persisting, and being without submission.

3 Not pardoning them only, but working a good for them.

The Necessity of this Loue is,

1 Because God loueth vs being his enimyes, and we must doe, as we would be done vnto.

2 There is none so bad but hath some what excellent in him, and none so harmed vs now, but he may doe vs good hereafter; and for this is to be loued.

2 Loue to our freindes is either } for publicke respect.
or
private, and particular.

1 Loue for publicke respect is the loue of our Country, that is the duty of all; but it is most splendent in heroickes, who pawne their life for it.

It was questioned, whether this loue was ingrafted by nature, or assumed by custome? *Ob Lipsius*

1 If it come by nature, why doth not the poore loue as well as the rich?

2 How comes it, that many for game leave their country, never to returne, sith, where we loue, we loue to converse: Some haue beene Traytors against it, and Neroes to fire it.

We answere, Nature cannot be so stricke, right, and even,

D

but

but sometime she breeds Monsters: gaine may withdraw mens hearts, and fasten them to forraine Coastes.

The Poore loue their home, but rich men more, because they reape the goodnes of their countrey in a larger manner.

Mens loue of countrey is first for themselves, as we feare stormes, least our selues pinch for them, and we quench a fire, least our owne soules be fired by it.

- 2 Loue for priuate respects is either
- 1 Ascending to our Superiours.
 - 2 Descending to our inferiours.
 - 3 Betwixt equalls.

1 That in decent is farre more hearty then that in ascent: Hence fathers are more louing to children, then children to fathers:

2 That betwixt Equalls stands vpon more Indifferency of Points; and in the best counterpoyle of either they may fall to larringe: Hence Brothers and Sisters fall to larring, and freinds haue many distastes.

These Loues are linked either by bonde

- Naturall,
- or
- Civill.

1 The Naturall bonde is threefold,

- 1 Vnder God to parents, who challenge of vs
- 1 Honour.
 - 2 Maintenance, if need so require.

It was *Solons* law, that none should be free from their duty, but those that had learned no trade of their fathers.

Parents are either of

- 1 Blood, that frame vs in body.
- 2 Manners, that by direction frame vs in Soule; such are teachers.

It was *Socrates* his tenent, that by nature both these had challenge of Loue: it is also doubted by many, whether *Alexanders* debt was not as ample to *Aristotle* his maister, as to *Philip* his father.

2 Our bond of na- } Brethren.
ture is to } Sisters.

They challenge of vs,

I Counsell.

2 Liberty of Conference.

3 **Pleasure of Conversation.**

4 Helpes of Fortune ; So we wronge not our felues over-
much in furnishing them:

Vivet extento Proculcius vivo

Notus in fratres animi paterni.

Brothers loue is {
1 Honoured by our freinds.
2 Envi'd and feared of our enimyes.
3 Usefull to our selues.
4 Ioyous to our Parents.

King Eumenes his Mother professed her selfe happy in this, that of 4 Sonnes 3 yongest squired the body of the eldest, and that *Eumenes* was nothing ielous or mistrustfull of them: Nature hath made them in a family feete to beare vp our body both in equality and proportion; If they exceed, they cause halting, if they trip at one another, they cause fallinge.

A *Lady of Persia* made it a great dispute, whether they were better to loose her brother, or her sonne; she sayd they could get a new sonne, but a brother, sith her Parents were dead, they could nor.

Brothers dilike (it may bee) often admits remedy, but
their hate is irreconcilable: As the Ioyntures of Art, though
ruien with rents, may be glewed againe, but Natures breach
cannot.

The special Motives of their dislike are 2.

1 If we leaue their commerce, and follow strangers as if
wee should cut off our flesh and inch in the roome of it a
strange peece: And the *Arcadian* Poet in *Homer*, when hee
had lost his legge, for his best help was to hoppe on a legge
of Wood; strangers wilbe distrustfull of vs, sith we leaue our
owne.

Can you stile youre freind brother, when you cannot account a brother youre freind: as absurd a thing, as if you mangled his naturall body: but hang'd his Idoll with laces and Carlands.

2 If we are alwayes checking, and thwarting their courtes, as *Lince* sayd by his short wife, of 2 Evills, the least is to bee chosen: So if our brother be bad, rather let him haue his fourth, then degerite his hate.

Though the dog bite and the horse throw vs, yet wee keepe them, and wee suffer Apes, Catts and Lyons, though sometimes harmfull.

Wincking at faults in companie is viuall, when we would not displease, though it be not so honest, yet for avoydance of further Evils, it may be tolerated.

Wee must bee our Brothers Freind, not his Iudge,

3 Our bond of Nature is to our kinne either of $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Blood,} \\ \text{or} \\ \text{Marriage.} \end{array} \right.$

both galling offices of loue proper to the familie.

as Invitation to $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Marriage feasts.} \\ \text{Funeralls.} \end{array} \right.$

1 The civill bond of loue is to $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 1 \text{ Citizens.} \\ 2 \text{ Countrey-men.} \\ 3 \text{ Strangers.} \end{array} \right. \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{As particuler re-} \\ \text{spects vary, so this} \\ \text{order varies.} \end{array} \right.$

It is the engaging of man vnto man in heart began by vse and acquaintance: it acherb, as one Soule in 2 Bodies.

There are 2 branches of it $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 1 \text{ Wishing.} \\ 2 \text{ Indeaouering the best for} \\ \text{another not for his owne but} \\ \text{the others sake.} \end{array} \right.$

The maine motiues of it are the 3 goods $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 1 \text{ Pleasure.} \\ 2 \text{ Profit.} \\ 3 \text{ Honesty.} \end{array} \right.$

1 Pleasure $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{are the aymes of } \textit{Epicures}; \text{ loues as they are di-} \\ \text{verse, and fancifull, so such loues must bee.} \end{array} \right.$

3 Honesty makes loue more settled: it appeares not as *Alcibiades*

epiades changing his coate to the fashion of the Place, but
as *Socrates* keeps his tenor.

This loue gets his growth by 3 knots }
1 Affecting .
2 Acquaintance.
3 Trust.

The Twine to wind and fasten it must be a Resemblance of
Manners.

Motives to make me affect one

- 1 I see him sympathize } Ioy }
with my } Griefe } befreinding *Brutus*.
- 2 He accounts my friends his and my enemies his; So *Cicero*
loued *Appian Pulcher* for *Brutus* his sake, and by it bound
Brutus the more to him.
- 3 He is pleasant-hearted and iesting; If I test with him hee
takes it not amisse.
- 4 He reportes well of me behind my backe and rather in se-
cret shew his mind then in publike it should be told me.
- 5 Hee delights in my Company.
- 6 Hee goes neate, but curious in apparell: this was *Demof-
sthenes* and *Hortensius* his trick to get them favorites, when
they first began pleading.
- 7 Hee liues peaceably with others, which perswades me, hee
will doe so with me too.

These things may moue affecting } Flatterer } may dee
in me not acquaintance, sith the } Dissembler } as much

Motives to moue me to acquaintance.

- 1 Hee reports well of me before myne Enemies, and if they
except, he defends me.
- 2 I see him honestly given, not giddily.
- 3 He doth me a good turne, so it be noe preiudice to him-
selfe.
- 4 He is noe busie-medler in my matters.
- 5 He overthwartes me not in talke, especially being either
serious or agrie.
- 6 He keeps the 7 former motives without dissimulation.

These moue acquaintance, and I would trust him in mat-

ters obvious, and ordinary, but in things secret, and nearly touching me, I may not, vnlesse he had Wisdome ioyned to his Honesty.

Motiues to moue me to trust him.

- 1 He hath all the 7 former circumstances without dissimulation and the 6 latter with wisdome.
- 2 He is wary, that he be not felt by others to open himselfe by Ignorance.
- 3 He doth me a good turne though to his owne Preiudice.
- 4 If I haue wronged him, he will not revenge it, though hauing opportunity.
- 5 He suffers wrong for my sake.
- 6 He discloseth to me his hart, opens his faults, sheweth me his hopes and feares.

This makes the vp shot of loue, and the Bond of Friendship. As the Diamond engraues the Diamond, and fire encreases fire: so his loue encreaseth my loue, and makes vp an Vnion betwene vs.

Saris de Amore prima Passione.

X. *Of Desire the 2. Passion.*

Desire is the stoppe, and scale of Loue: it addes vehemency to our affecting.

The object of it is some pleasing good; The issue delight.

Goods are made pleasant } Nature or
vnto vs either by } Custome.

- 1 By nature are such as in them selues haue no Paine.
- 2 By Custome the hunts-man affectes the cold winters-walkes, and the student loueth his watchings, and they are desirable to him, though in themselves are painfull, but are pleasant for the End.

Desire is } with Hope.
partly } without hope.

- 1 If a thing desired be within compasse of attainment wee rayse

rayse vp our powers within, and watch helps abroad to gaine it, then desire is ioyned with Hope.

2 If it be not likely to be gained, it leaues hope, and spends it selfe only in wishing.

Thus we { Mines of Gold } though there bee noe
desire { Managements of States } hope or expectance of it
About Desire are these Tenents

1 It is a note of want, and Impotency. Thence the covetous are sayd alwayes to bee wanting in their greatest Abundance.

2 It is never but with greife, till the thing be obtained, and in the attainment it ceases. Hence it cannot be in God, seeing in him is noe Want, Greife, or Passibility of Nature.

3 We cannot desire things, we know not.

4 It is limited only by satisfaction; without it growes eager importunity.

5 It is grounded only vpon Sense: Angells properly haue it not nor Plantes.

6 It appeares first in beasts: In a more pregnant manner it is in men, seeing in them the sensible part is more various, as hauing opinion to floate and to cast their desires to infinite resolutions. which beasts want.

Desire is either { Proper,
or
Improper.

1 The Improper is an Inclination to the regaining of a Good; this is called *Appetitus naturalis*, by which the Earth beareth downeward, the fire vpward, and by it appears in all Naturall Bodies.

2 The Proper is in men principally.

This is for the bettering either of the { Reasonable part,
or
Sensible part.

1 For the reasonable, there is a desire of knowledge naturally in-grafted in the Soule.

2 For

2 For the fenſitiue part, the deſires are } Meates.
either neceſſary as of } Drinckes.

Naturall not neceſſary, as Venery, which though it be neceſſary to man in *Specie*, yet is not to this or that man in *Individuo*: Neither naturall, nor neceſſary, as are all Phantaſies, and conceited Appetites.

The 2 former is common to men with beaſtes.

The laſt comes by an Opinative apprehenſion of Colou-
rable goods it opens it ſelfe moſt in Exceſſe of things: It
growes boundles and infinite, for as opinion is infinite, to
theſe deſires brooded, and hatched by it muſt be infinite.

Fancied Deſires are } Extraordinary
either. } Ordinary.

1 The Extraordinary are cauſed by diſeaſes, as the chole-
ricke deſires hony, the Fever-ſicke Wine, other ſea- chalke,
coales &c. or are incident to great bellies, whoſe longing
proceedes from a raw cold Humour; If they faile of it, they
either endanger themſelues, or their infants; it comes eſpeci-
ally, when they travell for Wenches, The Low-countrey-wo-
men of all others are moſt giuen to theſe deſires, becauſe of
their coldneſſe of Temper.

2 The ordinary ariſeth from Voluntary Paſſions.

They bend } Pleaſure.
either to } Profit.

1 The deſires bending to Pleaſures are mainly to ſooth the
ſences. Theſe are crauing and exceſſiue all ioynd make vp
luxury. *Cleopatra* in her Voyage to *Anthony* had all theſe,
odours for her ſmell, Muſicke for her Eares, cakes for her taſt,
coſtly hangings and ſoft pilowes for her ſight and touch.

The like was noted of *Antiochus* in his warre againſt the
Romans.

The 2 ſpeciall ſciences that Luxurie } Touching.
ſeekes to pleaſe are } Taſting.

From theſe ariſe 2. } 1 Luſt for Venery.
importunate ones } 2 Liqueuſenes for } Meates.
} Drinckes.

The

The Excurrances of both these are a certaine signe of a corrupt, lewd, and intemperate Soule.

1 Lust is in beasts, but exceeds in men.

1 Beasts haue it but at set times, men at their Pleasure, *ad Libitum*.

2 Beasts haue it lesse violently, men, so, that many haue wrought their deaths for it.

The only way to allay it, } Right reason.
and to excell beasts is } Religion.

Our Caueats against it must be } 1 Wordes.
to avoyd wanton } 2 G-stures.
} 3 Meates.

It neuer admits moderation, and warrantize, but only in the bond of Marriage.

2 Liquoroufnes for meates and drinckes aimes not at necessity, but pampering: thence it cannot be truly in beasts, who feed not but for hunger.

This Desire is icene in vs } Eating overmuch.
either } Too greedily for the Time.
} Inseasonably at all times.
} Feeding rather on delicacies,
} then strong meates.

It is *Seneca's* saying of the Belly. *Parvo contentus est, si des illi quod debes, non quod potes.*

2 Desires ayeming at profit } Wealth, as Covetousnes.
are either of } Honour, as Ambition.

1 Covetousnes is for the Purse, it gapes after mony, either to haue it only in possession, this is Parsimony: or to haue it for Use, and purveyance, not of natures, but of Superfluities: This desire may be termed Vaunting, or ostentation.

Parsimonie is only to haue, not to Use; It is the truest note of Poverty.

Increase rather feedes, then allayes it: he that still drinckes, *Plutarch*, and cannot be satisfied, needs rather purging, then filling.

These extort from others not to benefit themselves: but wee rather hate the Viper, that stings only to kill, then the

Beare or Lyon, that kill only to eate.

They make other to want: yet themselves are like the Bath-masters Asses, that carry on their backs the Rubbers and the cleansing Towells, yet they themselves are all mired with filth: They neuer profit, but by their death. As a kind of mice feeding in the gold-mines eate the Ore, yet redeliver it not till they be exenterated.

This Desire growes infinite, and ariseth from 3. heads

1 Imitation of them, whom we see to prosper and we wish to be as they are.

2 We make Wealth our End, not our meanes *Concupiscentia finis solum infinita*; meanes to Ends are bounded, sith the end is beyond them.

3 Riches are for Use; they are not of themselves good; As man cannot be sure of his estate, but he may require helps from them, and as losses are ever imminent, Soe riches are ever desired for prevention: Desire of mony for Ostentation aimes wholly at superfluity: if at necessities, the poore might equall the rich in this Kind: And *Diogenes* might by this as well vaunt himselfe in his Tubbe, as *Alexander* in his Throne. One came to *Scopa Thessalus*, but to beg some of his superfluous stuffe, his answer was that the grace of his Wealth was seene in superfluities rather then in necessities. It is ment as at *Thebes*, and *Callias* at *Athens* both the richest of their times bare no greater port, then *Epanimondas*, or *Socrates*, we might terme their Wealth blind, and hartles: Therefore *Telemachus* in *Homer* passes over *Nestors* household, where all was frugally, nothing superfluous, but amplifies in rich termes the gaudie and costly furniture of *Menelaus*.

This Desire Ends in Expence, as the former in keeping,

They are opposed as Logicke and Rhetoricke, the one fembles the hand in spreading, the other in closing.

Logicke is for the Couetous to learne to count λογισμῶν *computo*. As Rhetoricke for the Vaunter to Vent, and vtter himselfe: this is the cheife factor for gaines both to antique, and moderne pleaders.

Cicero

----- *Ciceroni nemo ducentos*

Iam dederit nummos, nisi fulserit annulus ingens, &c.

The way to stop both these golden desires is contentation in our present estate: this is called by *Socrates* the Soules riches.

Brevissima ad divitias per contemptum divitiarum via.

Seneca.

2 Desires of honour ter. } Low and competent }
med Ambition is either of } Highest, and best } Honors.

It ariseth from 2. heades.

- 1 Presumption of our owne worth.
- 2 Pride over others.

The abates of it are } Humility in respect of our selves.
 } Charity in respect of others.

As we may not meerey want this desire, so wee must not let it exceed in vs; The Excesse breedes Envy in all; the defect is faultie only in those, which haue desert, occasion, and fitte meanes to gaine their honour.

Men of Worth to extenuate their goodes, and giftes, when necessity requires their tryall, is to bury their goods with them, and to wrong the Weale publicke

This desire in the meane is only allowable.

If it be of lower Honors it is termed Modesty, if it perch to the highest, it is magnanimity, and is only for great hartes, and the best perfections.

Both these are grounded on foure conditions.

- 1 That we challenge no more honor, then what in the opinion of the best we haue deserued.
- 2 That we get them by lawfull meanes, not by out-striping others.
- 3 That we rest without seeking more, hauing gotten the former,

Unless they bee } Easily offered.
 } Forcible put on vs.

- 4 That we keepe our Place, and defend it against all backbiters, and murmurers.

Satis de cupiditate Secunda Passione.

XI. Of Hope the 3. Passion.

AS Loue and Desire } Hope. }
 is to affect good, so } Boldnes. } to prosecute it. (
 The 2. former come from the concupiscible, as a Lord to
 will.

The 2. latter as a steward to purvey, and proceeds from
 the Irascible.

Loue is the base, to Desire; so Hope to Boldnesse.

- 1 It is alwaies the apprehender of Good.
- 2 The goods must not be in presence, but in future.
- 3 It must be of a thing not easie, and without searce, but
 hard to compassse.
- 4 It must not be so hard, but it must apparantly be in possi-
 bility to attaine.

It hath these Tenents.

- 1 It is neither without assurance, though not of the thing,
 yet of perswasion.
- 2 It makes vs take delight in things painefull.
- 3 The suter the hope is, the greater is the Ioy, when the
 thing is attained.
- 4 It brings securitie, and barreth feare.
- 5 The Adiunct of it is Expectation; herein is some greife
 sith we yet want the good, which we would haue in presence.
- 6 It is a note of imperfection of being: whence it is only
 for this life, it goes not beyond.

- 7 It moues our powers of } Bodie }
 } Soule } for atchiuements.

The Persons giuen to Hope are,

- 1 They that rather haue deserued, or intend to deserue well
 of vs.
- 2 They that haue potencie of friends and best meanes.
- 3 They that haue hotte, and quicke spirits, which enlarge
 our harts to attempts.

Hence

Hence young men, and Drunkards are most given this way.

Old men are least hoping {
 1 For the coldnesse of temper,
 making them vnfit to attempt.
 2 For their experience of many
 dangers, and stoppages, which
 contrary, and crosse their hope.

4 They that quickly apprehend the good, but fore cast not
 the stoppage in the way, that hinders the good: Thence
 Fooles, and Inconsiderate persons build only vpon Hope.

The kindes of Hope.

Hope is either {
 1 Naturall.
 2 Supernaturall
 or Theologicall.

1 The Supernaturall is a Vertue only infused by God.

The second Sister to {
 Faith.
 Charitie.

2 The Naturall is either {
 Improper.
 Proper.

1 Improperlie it is in beasts: As the Dog springs the Deere
 within Compasse of attaineing, hopes to take him: So the
 Hauke the Partridge.

How should beast haue hope, sith hope comes from the Object:
 Vnderstanding?

Beastes haue their naturall instinct which proceedes from ^{Sch}
 God, and vnderstanding without them: by it they Iudge of
 things future, as the Emmer foreseees the cold Winter, Mice
 leaue the house, when it begins to fall, and Ravens oft fore-
 tell weather.

2 Hope Proper is in men only.

It is either {
 Necessary that must be.
 Possible, that may be otherwise.

1 Things necessary are hoped for: as the Iewes calling, the
 worlds End, the Resurrection, which cannot be otherwise,
 because God hath appointed it.

Things Possible {
 are attained Partly by ourselues.
 Partly by others.

Then our Hope relies much on others helpe.

Motives to raise hope.

- 1 Shew the meanes to be strong and pregnant.
- 2 That the Evills feared are not in proportion to the goodes expected.
- 3 That to men of religion we must not vrge the generall only but the particuler Providence of God.
- 4 To graue men vse rather few and strong reasons, then many and weake: To the common sort vse probabilities rather of circumstance then realities of substance, because of Ignorance they are ledde most with coniectures.

Satus de Spe 3^a. Passione.

XII. *Of Boldnes the 4th. Passion.*

Boldnes hartens our Hope, as desire doth our loue.

Its obiekt is mixt { Evils to be remoued
{ Goods to be attained.

It goes vnder the name of Conscience and Courage: It begins with reluctance, and strugling, but ends with Victory.

Courage is either { Suddaine vpon Sence.
{ Deliberate vpon Reason.

1 That vpon Sence grounds only vpon a presuming hope. Weighes not every occurrence of danger, begins with resolution, but seeing dangers arise vnlooked for, slackes and often failes, before it overcome: Thus quicke in the onset, but slow in the Issue.

2 That vpon reason begins slowly, endeth ventroullie, viewes every circumstance, fore-layes the vttermost of dangers: If it happens lesse then his account, it hartens him the more, he resolues to conquere by out-faceing danger.

An example of both is seene in *Lucius Paulus*, and *Terentius Varro* the 2. Roman Generall at the overthrow of *Canna*.

Courage

Courage hath his 2. Extreames } Heady rashnes.
 } Base cowardize.

The parties most couragious are.

1 Whose temper of Body is such, that they are hot spirit-
 red; which happens in three sorts of men,

1 Whose heart is litle, because of combring and closing of
 spirits, whereas in the larger hartes their diffusion caueth
 feare.

2 Whose luges are greatest and fullest of blood: This ar-
 gues plenty of heate, and much quicknes.

3 Who are heated with much Wine: Thence the *Germanz*
 vsed it principally in their consultations of Warre: And *A-*
lexanders drinking was thought to adde some-what to his
 courage.

2 They that haue many and strong helpes, are ventrous.

3 They that be most subiect to choller.

4 They that rely on Gods promises, and cast their hopes
 vpon him.

Hence it is, That Martyrs are most reiolute.

5 They that haue a conscience of their Innocency: on the
 contrary they are most fearfull, which haue beene most in-
 jurious.

6 They that haue oft escaped dangers: hence old Souldiers
 are more ventrous, then fresh water-men.

7 They that see not inconueniencies, and stops: Hence the
 wiser sort are more cautelous, and none so desperate, as he,
 that fore-tees least.

5. Motiues to make couragious.

1 Shew the Excellence of the Victory: The meanes easy,
 and present, that must compasse it.

2 If our equals and inferiors haue overcome: why should
 not we hope the like? It was *Cicero's* argument to perswade
 the sufferance of Evill: If children at *Sparta* could endure
 strokes without groaning, why should not men? And a-
 mongst men if the barbarous vaunt before their enemies,
 why should the learned tremble.

3 Set them into anger: this makes a boyling of their blood, and by consequence courage: Anger is wrought by laying open their wrongs, and disgraces offered without a cause.

4 Shew { Paucity } of their enemies, { Will not } oppose
the { Weaknes } that they either { Dare not } them.

5 That in former combates they haue had successe, and why not in these standing in the same proportion.

Our maine worke must be to { Perswade hope. }
{ Excell feare }

Satis de Fiducia 4^a. Passione.

XIII Of Pleasure the 5th. Passion.

THIS is the aime and vp-shot of the 4. former Passions:
Love { are like the qualities of lightnes in fire, which
Desire { inclineth
it to make { Hope. } like the motion or Passage of it.
{ Boldnes. }

Pleasure resultes as the quietnes and rest of the Soule in her object: it is neuer hearty before the goods are in presence.

It is generally in men and beaſts; it is steamed properly pleasure, or delight: As it is in men by Opinion, it is called Ioy, *Gaudium*.

Aquinas.

This in men hath { 1 Enlarging the hart: hence properly
2. operations, *sc:* { ly it is called *latitia, quasi latitia*.
{ 2 Forcing outward gestures, and so
it is called *Exultatio*.

The Tenents touching it are,

1 Noe Passion is so vehement: So that many haue dyed of it; the reason is because it opens the hart, and being overmuch passes out the spirits, that keepe in life.

2 The greater Ioy, the greater content, and in men it is the consequent of happines.

3 It is neuer true, and of continuance, but where there is Peace of Conscience.

4 It is the Adjunct of Vertue.

5 It is increased by Variety of objectes.

6 It purifies the Soule, helps concoction, expelles superfluities.

hence the merry haue } Good wittes.
 } Faire complexions.

7 It is for goods present: though we joy for remembrance of things past, or for hope of things future, yet they are apprehended by vs in a sort of Presence.

Motives to raise delights in a man are,

1 Perswade } Loue } of those things, we would haue
 him to a } Desire } him delighted in.

2 Marke his inclination, sort, profession, and frame your selfe to the like practises.

3 Amplifie the goodnes of the thing, we would haue him delight in, not by describing it in grosse, but viewing every particular: Thence Poets in their loue-legends describe every part of their M^{rs} the more to delight.

4 Shew the continuance of this Ioy, that it breeds not after-repentance Variety quicketh delight, and vniformity rayseth loathing.

Pleasure is } Comon to men with beastes
 } Proper to men alone.

1 That in common is the Issue of Sence, and comes from a naturall appetite,

It is } Negative for the avoydance only of trouble.
 } Positive for the gaining of some reall good.

This grounded on } 1 The attaineing of a good convenient.
 2 conditions, viz. } 2 The perswasion that we haue attained it.

2 That proper to men is voluntary and hatched by Opinion.

It is either of } Mind or } The Pleasures of the mind are
 } Body } best, yet all

F

not

not warrantable, { Prone } take delight in their passions,
 as the { Malicious }
 yet their minds are corrupt : these begin in hope, but end in
 shame and Griefe.

The truest delight of the mind without repentance is { 1 Meditation on God, and
 heavenly things.
 2 The view of learning.

Eudoxus wished to be burn'd with *Phaeton*, so he might
 stand neere the sunne to contemplate the nature of it : And
Archimedes left not his drawing of lines, till a sword was
 drawn through his body.

Pleasures of the body are sensuall, and quickly Exceed
 Measure,

The Properties of them are { 1 Inconstancie and fleeting.
 2 Satiety, & cloying like rancke meate.
 3 Ending in repentance.
 4 They quench the thirst no more then
 Salt water, that wets the palate, but in-
 flames the stomacke.

They are perswaded by three Enimyes. { 1 World.
 2 Flesh.
 3 Devill.

The Word- { Present } Joy for future,
 lingstake { Apparent } and reall payne.

The good had rather suffer here, and play hereafter.

Sensuall pleasures proceed from the diverse affecting of
 the Sences, as Musicke, and odors affect the Eare and Smell,
 pictures the Eye, &c. The strongest delight comes from the
 Sense of touching, The reason is, Delight is caused of Loue:
 we loue those things, that most besteed vs, of all the Sences
 touching is most vlesfull ; without which it is impossible we
 should liue: And as the goods affected by it are more deare;
 so the pleasure, when it is attained, must be more moving.

These bodily exercises in their Excesse distract the minds,
 and hinder the vse of right reason.

XIIII. Of Hate and Detesting.

These are the 2. { Loue. } Hate begins the dislike, de-
 opposites of { Desire. } detesting is the vehemen-
 cy of it.

The object of both is evill: { Thing.
 It is either of the { Person.

1 The thing hated principally is Sinne, and for it we dislike
 of the Person

Sinne is { 1 Nature this { Moralists. } sith all partake of
 against the { breeds the { nature, and are
 law of { hate of either { Heathens. } bound to its laws.
 2 Grace, this breeds the hate of Christians.

2 The Person we may not simply hate. It is proper to

Ubicumq; homo est, ibi beneficio locus est.

Seneca

3 heads of Sin moue hate { 1 Irreligion towards God.
 { 2 Injustice towards men.
 { 3 A selfe inclination to evils
 without outward motiues.

If these heads grow stronger, and are done wilfully, it
 transcends hate, and nows detestation.

The principle object of it is Atheisme.

1 It is the ground-plot of all other sinnes.

2 It is an evill of Will, not of Vnderstanding; we cannot
 alledge Ignorance for that, which the creature reueales. It is
 voluntary presumption.

3 Athists are most vnfit for Society.

Their commerce is either { 1 Scoffing.
 { 2 Impudency.
 { 3 Vaine.

of that Constitution, as is most contrary to wisdom, and
 morall gravity.

These things moue the greatest detestation.

Hate is either { In common against states.
Particular for private respects.

1 That in common anyes, if { Their religion be in oposition to ours.
Their lawes be against nature.
Their oft iniuries done be without hope of righting.

2 Hate for private respects, is { 1 Against a wronger { 1 Tyrants
of many, as { 2 Extortioners.
2 Against a wronger of himselfe only for the indignity of his person.

This is set downe by its life { 1 Towards God.
2 Towards himselfe.
3 Towards his Neighbour.

His entry into the World is shametull, his stay, and departure hence with misreport, like a snuffe leauing a stincke, when the light is out.

Satis de odio, & detestatione.

XV. *Of Despayre and Feare.*

These 2. are { Hope.
opposite to { Boldnes.

Their speciall Art is in auoyding the future euill, which seeing they cannot master, they yeld.

1 Despaire ariseth from fayle of helpes.

2 Feare from the Imminence of euills.

The tenents of despaire are 3.

1 It deiecteth the minde.

2 It makes venterous to try the vtmost of dangers.

3 It is deepest in them, who before had greatest hopes.

The tenents of feare are 3.

1 It is never moved, but where some spice of hope is, for things without remedy are rather despaire, then feare.

2 The greater the things feared, and of long continuance, the

the greater is the feare.

3 It prepares Patience, awakes industry whereas despaire is only in suffering.

It ariseth from 3 { 1 The debility of the person.
heads { 1 The greatnes of the danger.
 { 3 The certaintie and imminency thereof

Feare is either of a { Person.
 { Thing

1 Of a Person { 1 Filiall, which is properly loue.
it is either { 2 Servile, which is only for escape.

The persons most feared by vs are.

- 1 Great men offended with vs.
- 2 Lewd men made powerfull.
- 3 They who stand in bodily feare of vs.
- 4 High stomackes wronged by vs.
- 5 They, who haue our life and credit in their hands

We feare them { 1 As in themselves faithlesse.
either { 2 To be provoked
 { 3 Gaine.
 { 2 Threates.
 { 3 Danger on their part,
 { want of service in our part

Persons not much to be feared are.

- 1 They that are soone angry, and soone pleased.
- 2 They which open themselves too much in menaces and threats.
- 3 They that disclose their purposes. They close heart conceits malice. *Vlysses* is sayd to dissemble his dislike for the Woers ryot; but revenged them at occasion. *Anthony* and *Dolabella* frayd not *Cæsar*, though they conspired against him: Hee answered he feared not those fatte, and open fact Traytors, but two leane ones *Brutus* and *Cassius* which proved his death-men. *Demissos animo, & tacitos vitare memeto.*

2 Things feared are { 1 Destruction to the whole man, or
evills bringing either { 2 Baine to any part of him.

Evils are of { 1 Sin, *malum culpæ.*
 { 2 Punishment, *malum pænæ.*

1 The former is feared by the best men.

2 The latter is feared by the worst.

The parties most fearfull are,

1 They, whose quantity of heart is such, that it diffuseth the spirits.

2 They, that know their owne weaknes, and others ablenes to hurt.

3 They, that amplifys on the Evills feared.

The parties least fearefull are,

The { Wise } who count { Sinne } which they endea-
 { Iust } no euill but { Disgrace } vour to avoyd.

1 The most couragious.

2 They that preferre honour before their lives.

3 They that haue strength of meanes to backe them.

Satis de desperatione, & metu,

XVI Of Greife, ..

Greife is the End of the former Passions, and ariseth from the presence of euill.

It is of { Body. } that of the minde is more dangerous.
 { Minde. }

The renents of it are;

1 It neuer touches things of absolute perfection, as God, Angells, &c. but is there most frequent, where is most plenty of euills, as in hell.

2 It dryeth the Body and ingendereth melancholy by cold blood.

3 It makes one vnfit for Action.

It growes { 1 Yeilding too much to pleasures.

vp on vs by { 2 Entertayning a conceit of euils present.

The Way to resist it in our selues.

1 Propose to your selues examples of Patience, as of *Marinus. Itatuli dolorem; vi vir & vi homo maiorem ferre sine causa necessaria noluit.*

1 Resolue

2 Resolue to resist evils. As that Souldier, that stands it out, often winnes, when the coward dies by flight. *Animi contentio Sola officij tanquam custodia.*

3 That the euils now are not so great, but the goods ensuing counterpoysse them.

The way to allay it in } Perswasion of a good to come.
others is comfort } Removall of an evil present.

In it are 2. things.

1 The time to apply it, when the greife is ripened, not newly begun; As Surgeons first let the sore soften, before they begin to draw it.

2 The manner of } Generall.
applicijg it is } Speciall.

1 The Generall by these places.

1 Shew how greater evils haue happened to others, then we now suffer. It was *Socrates* his saying, if of all mens evils heaped together all should haue equall share, each would rest content with their present estate.

2 Our evils be ordinary, and } 1 Cares of minde.
do what we can, we shall haue } 2 Diseases of Body.

3 If the thing be remediable, shew the meanes of regaining it; if not, yet it is a folly to mourne for it.

4 That God sees, what is better for vs, then we for our selues.

2 The speciall is according to the maine motiues of Griefe.

1 These are } Death.
} Temporall misfortune.

2 Our comfort death is.

1 It is vnauoydable by fate, and all men must, and do tast of it.

2 It is noe Evill, but a passage to a better life.

3 Our life hath many troubles, and anguishes, death is the quiet of them.

4 If we greiue for the dead, then either, because they are not or because they are in torment; If they are not, why greiue we more for their now not-being, then for our children yet vnborne

vnborne; If they be in torment, it is scene, they were evill, we were the better rid of them.

Of deaths they are most } Suddaine.
greuous, that are } Vntimely.

Against these our comforts are 3.

1 We ever beare Corruption in our flesh, that in a moment may kill vs.

2 Dying yonge makes vs lesse fixt to the world, and fitter for God. *Græci dicit, a uobis dicitur vobis.* He calles vs hence as from a banquet, lest ouermuch sitting should make vs surfeit.

3 The thing cannot be suddaine, sith we are euer lyable to evill, We ought euer to expect it.

2. Our comfort for temporall misfortunes.

1 They come from Gods decree, and so are necessary to fall on vs.

2 They are profitable vnto vs, and debarre our insolence.

3 They may befall any as well as vs.

4 Shall we greiue euer or leaue at last? If ever, to great a misery we impose on vs: if we will leaue, why resolue we not at first.

The Persons most giuen to ^{be} Suffer are 3.

1 Whose temper of Body is Melancholie.

2 Weomen, because of their easines in yeilding.

3 They, who haue giuen themselves to ouermuch Ioy: This falling must end in depth of Griefe.

Satis de dolore.

XVII. Of Samefacenes.

It is a mixt passion } Feare of infamy.
joynd with } Loue of Honesty.

It ariseth partly } before a fault.
} After a fault.

It is only in good natures, but vnsteddy, soone fayling, and easly revoked by counsell: It is commendable in youth, but

but not in the Aged.

The Effects of it are 2.

1 It moues to vertue; thence termed *Purpura virtutis*.

2 It calls blood into the face. Reason and Passion moue the heart; the heart, the spirits, the spirits the blood.

Now shame consisteth of 2 passions

- 1 Feare, that gathers blood to the hart.
- 2 Loue, that sends it abroad to the outward parts.

If we feare only disgrace, and haue no loue to good, our blood keepes within: This is the signe of a bad nature, which being convicted of faults looks not redde; but pale in the Face.

If we feare not only disgrace, but loue and desire amendment, our blood spreadeth outward, and causeth blushing. *Aristoteles* his daughter being asked, what she counted the fayrest colour, answered the ruddy caused by an ingenuous blush.

It is a note of the best natures, and fittest for Counsell.

The reason, why the blood sheweth it selfe most in the face is, because as the blood is moued by the spirits so the spirits are most quicke, and animate the organ of sense; and the Organs of sense principally are about the face.

The Extreames of

- 1 *Auidia*, an overbashfulness
- 2 Impudence, the defect of shame.

Bashfulness in it selfe is not euill, but may often be a provocation to euill. It is grounded vpon an overlenity of nature, and easines of yeilding. The object of it is feare of infamy. The persons whom it may hurt are 3.

1 Young men as leading them to an vnsetled and floating carriage in manners.

2 It makes them easie to suitors, without respect of their choyce.

3 Incontinent persons; It makes them vnable to resist euill-motions, though in the yeilding they greiue at it.

4 It debarreth their courage in punishing faults, and makes them loth to displease.

5 They, which are rich, powerfull, kind-hearted, and haue many helps to further others.

1 It makes the rich { Rash lenders.
Heady sureties.

2 The kind harted by it either { 1 Follow the riot of bad company.
2 Beare false witnes for their Acquaintance.
3 Soone take paines for others.
4 loyne their to vnworthy men.

3 The powerfull haue many suitors, and by it are made easie to yeild to any demand, and prosper without election.

The way to barre it is to acquainte our selues with resistance to motions, denials of suits, if they be not honest, and convenient, but hurtfull to the granter.

The Inhabrants of *Asia* were all slaues, because they could not pronounce this word *no*. And *Brutus* said.

Impudence passeth not feare of Infamy.

The difference betwixt it and bashfullnesse is, that the bashfull retaineth a loue of vertue; the Impudent doeth not.

Perijt, cui perijt pudor.

Satis de pudore.

XVIII Of Repentance.

What it is

Repentance is an act of Conscience arising from the thought of an euill done.

It is either { 1 Theologicall, because of offences done against the law of Grace.
2 Morall because of things done against the law of nature, or common Honesty.

1 Repentance theologicall is in Christians alone.

2 Morall is in Heathens.

It is raised by three motiues { 1 Infamy.
2 Punishment.
3 Hate of vice.

1. That

1 That arising from feare of Infamy, and punishment is flauish, and incident to the most.

2 The best repent for the hate of vice: For as they loue good for the good, not for reward: So they hate euill for the Euills sake, not for the punishment.

The parts of repentance are 2. { 1 Hate of the euill done.

{ 2 Resolution of amendment.

It is deferyed 3. wayes { 1 By contrition of the hart.

{ 2 By confession of the mouth.

{ 3 By satisfaction by good workes.

Its propertyes are three.

1 Repentance must be with vehemency of greife, least, while our greife for the fault slackenes, our care for amendment slackenes also.

2 It must not be for a time, but for continuance, sith euill is ever to be hated, and good ever to be resolved vpon.

3 It must not be deferred, least delay breed custome of euill, and custome hardnes of hart.

The stops of repentance are 7.

1 Shame to confess our faults, or pride in not acknowledging them.

2 Delighting in our finnes.

3 Hope of longe life.

4 Despaire of obtaining grace.

5 Presumption of Gods mercy.

6 Longe custome of sinning.

7 Examples of bad men, which haue longe flourished, yet never repented.

The tenents of repentance are 5.

1 Repentance cannot be in a nature meere good, as God, nor meere bad, as the Deuill; but in such only as are partly good, and partly bad, as in men.

These are { Bad by nature; hence they offend.

{ Good by grace; hence they amend.

2 It is only in things, that we to fall: Beasts haue it not: those actions are not voluntary, but necessary, which cannot

be repented off.

3 It ariseth from a knowledge, and tast of sinne committed:
thence children haue it not.

4 It groundeth on hope: They that dye desperate haue it not, fith the desperate are swallowed vp with greife: The repentant receiue greife for the euill past, but ioy for the future good, and future things more moue then those past.

5 Repentance is ioyned with shame, as Impenitence is ioyned with impudence.

XIX. *Of Pitty.*

Pitty looks outwardly to the Evils of others, but by reflex to our own.

It is mix- } Greife for the Evills fallen.
ed with } Desire for their remedy.

ed with { Desire for their remedy.

Evills that raise pittie are 4

- 1 Greif of minde.
- 2 Torture of Body.
- 3 Danger of others death.
- 4 Misfortune in goods.

2 Tortu & Body.

2 Danger of others' death.

4 Misfortune in goods.

The Evils moue most

- 1 If they are so neare to fall, that we feare them.
- 2 It so lately fallen, that we freshly remember them.
- 3 If their then present falling barres our Expectance of contrary profit.

The Evills } 2 It so lately fallen, that we freshly remember
move most } them.

3 If their then present falling barres our Ex-
pectance of contrary profit.

The ground of pity is our communion of nature.

The extent of it is a Desire to helpe.

This desire hath § If we we are able to helpe.

2 conditions } If justice permit.

1 Greiuing for such as lawes, and Iustice will haue banish-
ed, is womanish.

2 For those we are not able to remedy, it is fruitlesse.

The Tenents of pity are 4.

The better nature, the more it is inclinable to it.

- 2 It is meaneſt to provoke charity.
- 3 It compares the evill fallen with the deſert, and concludes the perſon vnworthy to ſuffer it.

4 It brings vs to acknowledg our owne miſfortunes.

The parties moſt pittying are 5.

- 1 Old men } As not being ſo ſtomackefull, as the yonge.
partly } As hauing more experience of Dangers.
- 2 Weak- } Weomen } they thinke for their infirmity,
lings } Children } they may ſoone ſuffer the like.
- 3 Schollers, as being by bookes acquainted with many examples of dangers.
- 4 They that haue felt former evils, and now are ridde of them.

5 They that haue opinion of anothers worth, they count it below his deſerts to be in evils.

The parties leaſt pittying are 5.

- 1 Who are } Anger } they recount not the evils, that
moſt giuen to } Boldnes } may befall them.
- 2 Scoffers and they who are readie to wrong others.
- 3 They that are in ex- remitie of diſtreſſe: As in Cities be- ſeiged parents eat their owne children; whereas otherwiſe they viſed to pittie them. Their care is for the remedy of their owne harmes, little for others: thence they that feare im- minent dangers, pittie not others, but care for themſelues.
- 4 They that are in height of fortune not likely to fall. Thence tyrants and rich men pittie leaſt.
- 5 They that haue prejudice againſt others behaviour, what befalls them, they count it deſert, and doe leſſe greiue at it.

The perſons, whom we pittie moſt, are 4.

- 1 Acquaintance rather then ſtrangers.
 - 1 Yeares.
 - 2 Manners.
 - 3 Profeſſion.
 - 4 Office.
 - 5 Stocke.
- 2 Our equals either in
- 3 They who ſuffer thoſe evils, which wee our ſelues feared.

4 Men bearing { 1 Patience } by it we count them vnwor-
their harmes with { 2 Courage } thy of them, & so pittie them.

The way to raise pittie for others.

- 1 Shew the valour, and the worth of the person, that suffers.
 - 2 The greivousnes of the Evills befallen.
 - 3 The like may happen either to them, or their freinds.
- Conscience of a mans owne case moues it.

XX. *Of Zeale and Iealousie.*

1 **Z**eale is a Passion grounded on loue.

It is { 1 Griefe for a fault committed.
mixt with { 2 Desire for a good intended.

It borders on repentance, and is the issue and effect of it.

It is ever with fervency: It is most dangerous, vnlesse it
be regulated with knowledge.

It is either for a { Good quality.
the good of a person.

1 The former is in the best, who is zealous of good for
goodnes it selfe.

2 The latter comes from the respect of a person conceiued in
the behalfe of one, we loue.

It supposeth { Wrong done to our freind } or griefe for it,
Desire of remedy

2 Jealousy is a passion conceiting an Evill in another, that
perhaps is guiltles of it: it comes only by conjectures.

It proues often injurious.

It breeds trouble in our selues, and distrust to our freinds.

The way to barre it is, not to skanne the actions of o-
thers, but with a favourable interpretation.

XXI. Of Anger.

A Nger is a compound of sundry passions: As 1. Pleasure in revenge. 2. Greife in recounting the wrongs. 3. Insolence in ouerbearing. 4. Envy in repining at the welfare of others: The proper Act of it is desire of hurting.

The tenents of it are 5.

1 A just injury requires as just anger; and it is stupidity not to be moued with it.

2 It is not bent against men in generall, but to some in speciall only. Thence *Timon* is not sayd to be angry with all but hate all.

3 Noe passion is more indiscreet then it: thence it's ridiculous, and to be contemned, none more violent, thence terrible, and to be feared.

4 Being moderate, it whets Valour; but over-earnest it weakens revenge.

5 To be suddainly moued is a signe of weaknes; hence it agrees more to the sicke, then the sound, to old folkes then to yonge: And to Women.

----- *Quippe minuti*
Semper & inferni est animi exiguiq; voluptas.
Ultio continuo; sic collige, Quod vindicta
Nemo magis gaudet quam famina. -----

Adjuncts of anger are these viz. { 1 Vexation of mind.
2 Ignorance of his owne strength.
3 Vndecency of gesture.
4 Wrongfull opinion of others.

The causes raising it are { Generall.
Speciall.

1 The generall { 1 By derision in words { Body.
disrespect shewed { 2 Injury in deeds, as { Goods.
4 wayes. { against. { Name.

3 Ingratitude for good turnes 4 Want of due ob- servance from our.	{ 1 Freinds. 2 Inferiours either in	{ 1 Blood. 2 Authority. 3 Wealth. 4 Vertue.

2 The speciall are according to the nature of speciall persons.

1 If we haue too settled a perswasion of those we conuertie with, if they sayle in the contrary to our expectation, our choller riseth: Hence credulity inflames anger.

2 Curiosity inflames it, if we busie our selues too much in loue, and frivolous matters: Crosses in either of them fret vs.

3 If we delight in one thing more then another, when we should vse either with indifferency: As in an household, if our stuffe of this fashion like vs better then that, and we take pleasure in it, the losse or the mislaying of it frettes vs
 The waies to allay anger in others.

1 Proue the wronge done vpon	{ Ignorance. Constraunte. Suddaine Reason. Mischance.

2 That it was done to our owne harme, as well as his.

3 Shew sorrow for it, for outfacing growes of Impudency, that of disrespect, the nurse of Anger.

4 Be not opposite in talke.

5 Dissemble our Humility, and feare: the angred by this are lesse prone to revenge.

6 Seeme to be serious for his good, and overcome this wronge with other passages of kindnes.

7 Speake not against men of his sort and quality though their persons greiue him not.

8 Scoffe at none whatsoeuer, but be affable to all. *Isocrates. ad Damon.*

To beare anger in our selues the waies are 4.

1 Vse noe hart greife but	{ Sports. Games. Merriments	{ yet bar insolent delights, sit these are ouerbearing, and an- ger others.

2 Resolue

2 Resolute to resist choler by not easilie accepting discrespects.

3 A suddaine feare, or greife vnexpected allayeth ones anger.

4 If a wrong be offered, rather contemne the offerer as wanting witte, then thinke our selues disgraced by it.

How to behaue, our selues in anger. 3.

1 Bend our selues to a contrary passion; as *Socrates* with his freind laboured to looke most pleasantly on him.

2 Retire we our selues from Company till the passion hath spent it selfe.

3 Not to revenge before our anger be past.

Persons most giuen to anger. 4.

1 Weaklings, as Children, weomen, sicke men, old folkes.

2 They, that are ambitious, and standing for offices.

3 They, that require much awe and reverence of others.

4 They, that know their deserts well, yet are scorned.

The parties, with whom we are least angry.

1 They, who reuerence vs which argues, they doe not disrespect vs.

2 We cannot be angry with him, whom we feare; sith anger implyes hope of revenge: feare not.

3 Men doing things vpon choller, lesse anger vs.

4 Anger cannot be against those, whom we cannot hurt, as gods, and kings, that are out of our reach.

Satis de Ira.

XXII. Of Maligninge.

This Passion } 1 Envy greiving at another Good,
hath 2 partes } 2 *Envy* *malicious*, ioying for anothersevall.

1 It is in the worst-natures, and is opposite to common society.

2 It is principally betwixt equalls, as men of the same sort: hence we envy not those, that are in eminency aboue vs: A

H

common

These judgethings to be } Good.
 Then the will } Evill.
 records them } 1 For affecting it if it be good.
 } 2 For avoyding it, if it be evill.
 Of Practicke vnderstanding.

As the Speculative is the discerner of truth from falsehood: So the practicke of good from evill: Both judge from principles, & vndoubted opinions: The practicke judges only of morall principles arising out of the law of nature: Grounds, that *Ashes* assent vnto in the generall; though they will not follow them in particular.

The principles of these are.

- 1 Honour God.
- 2 Loue honesty.
- 3 Obay } Parents.
- } Magistrates.
- 4 Loue our Country.
- 5 Hurt no man, but doe, as you would be done by.
- 6 Yeild every man his owne.
- 7 Vse all sociably, and in freind- } Credit.
- ship, as far as stands wth our } Benefit.
- 8 Execute common malefactors for the common quiet sake.
- 9 Suffer distinction of Lordships, lands, bounds, mens private possessions, &c.

These rules all nations assent vnto, and from these institute their common weales, *Ius gentium*. The breach of these is accusab^{le} by nature, and this accusation is termed Conscience.

XXIIII Of Conscience.

Conscience is the immediate act of our soule, arising from a naturall apprehension of good, and avoydanc^e of evill: It cannot be totally extinguished in any.

It bring vs } To know our faults.
 } To condemne them.
 } To haue will to prosecute the contrary.

It is either of } faults past; so it } Checkes.
 } future, so it retaines. } Condemnes.

It is best in the meane, and } Large.
 most dangerous, when it is to } Nice.

1 The former calls euill good, and breeds presumption.

2 The latter counts of the best good as euill, and breeds despaire.

It grounds vpon this Syllogisme.

Noe euill is to be committed:

This particular is euill,

Ergo.

Not to be committed.

The Maior is drawne from the practicke vnderstanding out of the rules of Nature. The minor ariseth from view of particulars, which are variable, and may often deceiue; if our apprehension of them bee false, our Conscience must needs erre.

Error of conscience proceeds from these heads,

1 From ignorance, if we know } Chosen.
 not what is to be } Refused.

2 Negligence in not fitting our selues, and getting direction from others, if we find our owne weak.

3 Pride in not humbling our } Wiser.
 conceits to others, that are } Honester } then vs.

4 Singularity in following our owne priuate spirit.

5 Passion, that inclines Conscience to follow appetite. *Perit omne iudicium, cum res transiit in affectum.*

6 Pusillanimity in distrusting all things, and fearing to venture on any thing, least we offend: If we doe any thing against conscience, be it good or bad; the act vtterly is sinfull.

XXV. Of Consultation.

Consultation is grounded on these rules.

1 It is not touching the End, but of the meanes directing to it.

2 Things past are not to be consulted off, but things future.

3 Not necessary things, but contingent.

4 Things nothing appertaining to vs are not to be consulted off.

Our consultation is either { By our selues alone.
By others.

1 We consult with our- { 1 Of a great secrecy.
selues if the matter be { 2 Suddainly befallen.
3 If we haue not a freind to im-
part it.

2 To consult with others { Honest.
obserue them to bee { Wise.
Faithfull.

The question in our consultation is;

1 Whether the thing be convenient for vs,

2 Whether possibly to be compassed.

1 It is iudged con- { 1 Safe for vs, not discommodious.
venient if it be, viz. { 2 Not against the 4. { Prudence.
rules of Honesty. { Justice.
Temperance.
Fortitude.

2 Possibility of compassing it found out from view of all these meanes, we must vse in working that end.

The particular wayes of Consultation are.

1 Whether the thinge be profitable, or disprofitable.

2 Whether honest, or dishonest.

3 When 2. profits are proposed, we question, which is greatest,

4. If 2. things be honest, which is most honest.

H 3

5 When

5 When one part is only honest, the other only profitable, which is rather to be prosecuted.

In morality, the least honesty countervayles the most profit and is to be prefer'd before it: In Politickes or perswasion must be according to the auditory, with whom wee deliberate.

Before the Vulgar our consultation must be most inclining to profit, sith they are most addicted that way; before the better sort stand rather for honesty and Honour.

XXVI *Of Prudence.*

Prudence is a speciall quality of a moralist, being the sole directresse, and gouvernesse of all his actions.

It is only in things ambiguous, and borders on Consultation.

It consists in { Choyce.
Judgement.
Fittesse of Application.

It longe consulteth, and quickly executeth.

It corrects things past, directs the present, foresees the future.

The speciall rule of it, is silence in revealing our purpose.

The waies to get it are.

- 1 Industrie in { Disputing } matters practicke.
Reading }
- 2 Observations of mens carriages.
- 3 Noting what effects proceed out of what causes.
- 4 Acquaintance with sundry positive lawes especially of our owne land.
- 5 Using to invent much of our owne, not to stand strictly on authority of others.

The partes requisite to prudence are.

- 1 Memory for retaining experiences past.
- 2 Understanding for judging morall principles.

This

This gotten by -- { Hearing.
Inventing our selues.

3 That wee may be ready to heare is required docility, our readines to learne.

4 For invention is required, *Solertia*, a ripenes of finding out meanes.

5 When { Learned, { wee must conferre one thing with
we haue { Experienced, { another, and discourse of the con-
Invented, { uenience of it. Hence to prudence
is required reasoning.

Ratio.

6 Out of this discourse arise precepts for action.

Their obserue 3. things.

1 Direction for fit meanes to fit Ends. Hence is required Providence.

2 Weighing each circumstance of the busines: Hence Circumspection is required.

3 Avojding all stopps, and impediments: Hence is required Caution for evil.

XXVII. Of the Will.

The seate of the Will is the Heart, where passions reside
As the braine is the seate of the Vnderstanding.

The will prosecutes what the vnderstanding judges.

The object of it is Good: Of the vnderstanding Truth.

Will without passion chooseth the true good: with passion the forged and apparent only.

If goods be evident, it affects simply without prayse; if doubted, there is first deliberation.

It hath 2 partes, { 1 Approbation, or willing.
viz. { 2 Refusall, or nilling.

For execution it com- { Passions.
mandes in men { Faculty of motions.

1 The former it rules by perswasion, as by an Aristocracy

OT

This

or state regiment, whereby goverment is not so absolute, but the rest may interpose.

2 The latter it rules by command, as a Lord ouer his servant, without relent in the one, or reluctance in the other.

The tenents of the will are 2.

1 It affectes nothing, but what the vnderstanding hath weighed first and contrarily the Vnderstanding conceits nothing, but the will perswades; their offices are joynt and mutual.

2 It cannot be constrained being of greatest freedom and liberty: Though we haue not freedome of will, to come from worse to better, in matters of grace, yet in matters ciuill we haue, sith it comes from a common motion of goodnes conceiued by the practicke Vnderstanding.

XXVIII. *The Former causes of Vertue.*

To examine this we { 1 Nature.
enquire what is the { 2 Properties.
 { 3 Seuerall kindes of Vertue.

1 Its nature is to moderate the passionate part of the Soule, It is tearmed by *Plutarch*, A disposition of the vnderstanding part, according to Reason.

This reason { 1 Rules the passionate parte, so tearmed vertue.
either { 2 Yeilds vnto it: so it nurces vp vice.

Aristotle defines it thus.

1 It is not connaturall, but bred by custom, thence termed Habit.

2 Of Habits some { 1 Inforceiue as the vnderstanding, that compelles vs to assent vnto an eident truth.
 { 3 On choyce, and praelection, and such a one Vertue is.

3 Praelection and choyce may be of things vtterly nought, as when 2 evils stand compared, and in competition, but the choyce of vertue must rely on the meane for his Center: whereas

Defin.
Habitus.

Praelectivus

In medio
consisten.

whereas evils spread to the extreames, and multiply degrees: Goodnes acknowledges one only point of perfection, The golden mediocrity.

Mediocrity changes } 1 Time. } if it were set, and defini-
according to circum- } 2 Place. } tiuely one.
stance of } 3 Person.

It were vertue for all to vie it alike, but the begger may not be liberall of his purse, though a king may; And *Milo* the wrattler may eate large meales, when the weakeling taking the same proportion may be termed riotous: The spite of a man to a man is wholsome, but to a Serpent death: and what is vertuous to one, may proue a vice to a nother. This Mediocrity is to bee ruled by Iudgement of each circumstance, which prudence must prescribe.

Directions how we shall attaine the meane.

1 Of the 2. Extreames see which is most oppositeto vertue, and avoyd it.

2 Sift out the vice, our nature is most prone to, and labour to avoyd it, by taking the other extreame: As a man being giuen to be prodigall let him labour to be couetous. *Ab extremo ad extremum non pervenitur nisi per medium.* So wee straighten stickes by bending them as much the contrary way, as they are bent the other way.

3 Resolue to resist bodily pleasures, and embrace them of the minde. 2 The properties, and notes of vertue.

1 No morrall vertue, but } 1 The Excesse to be depressed:
is placed between 2 vices. } 2 Defect to be rayfed.

2 Its ever in action, } 1 Knowledge. *Scienter.*
and the action must be } 2 Perseuerance. *Constanter.*
with 3. conditions } 3 Willingnes. *Volenter.*

3 Delight in goodnes is a signe of the vertue gotten.
-- Sorrow argues, we do it unwillingly.

4 Vertue is converfant espe- } Greifes.
cially about the Moderating of } Pleasure.

fith these are the grounds and ends of all the rest.

5 It is exercised about the highest, and hardest employ-
ments.

6 It is ariable to all men, even to strangers, and enimies.

The grounds of vertue { 1 Religion towards God.
3. { 2 Charity to our neighbours.
{ 3 Cherishing our selues according to reason.

The comprehension of all vertue is vniuersall Iustice: by it
we yeild our duty to { God.
{ Neighbours.
{ our selues.

XXIX. The Seuerall Kindes of vertues.

Vertues are { 1 common to all.
either { 2 Speciall to some persons.

1 The common are requisite to all, though perhaps few
haue them.

They are either { 1 Proper, or full vertues
{ 2 Improper or halfe vertues.

1 Full Vertues are { 1 To our priuate good only.
directed either { 2 To the good of others.

1 Our priuate good is gotten { 1 Desire.
by the gouernance of 2 passions { 2 Feare.

1 Our desire is of things { Naturall.
{ Adventitious.

1 Naturall { Of nourishment: The vertue that tempers
this is Sobriety.
{ Of Venerie: the vertue, that allaiies this is
Chastity.

The conioyning of both is called Temperance.

2 Goods ad. { Wealth; the Vertue for this is content.
venitious, as of { Honour; the Vertue for this modesty, or a
decent competition, of what we deserue.

2 Our feare is allayed by Fortitude.

2 Vertues directed to the good of others are.

1 Iustice of { Exchange.
{ Distribution.

2 bestow.

- 2 Bestowing of } Greater ones, termed Magnificence.
 gifts for the } Smaller sort, Liberality.
 3 Courtesy, and pleasantnes of Conversation.
- 2 The halfe and im- } 1 Veracity, or a habit of telling truth
 perfect vertues are } 2 Grace of carriage.
 } 3 Emulation.
 } 4 Continence.
 } 5 Patience.
- 2 The vertue speciall to some persons is the Heroicall spirit,
 which cannot be incident to all, but only to the highest, and
 best perfections.

XXX. *Of Temperance.*

THIS con- } 1 Sobriety } Meats } both these } 1 Property.
 taines } touching } Drinks } haue their } 2 Effects.
 } 2 Chastity, tamer of lustes.

The property of Temperance.

1 With moderation to desire absent delights, and to vie
 them present honestly.

2 To affect only such as are lawfull, and honest.

3 For attaining, or inioying them } 1 Health.
 to doe nothing, that may prejudice } 2 Credit.
 } 3 Priuate Estate.

The effects of } 1 Soundnes of body.
 Temperance } 2 Strength of vnderstanding.
 } 3 Promptnes of both acquiring, and exer-
 cising all other vertues.

Excesse.

Meane.

Defecte.

Intemperance
 that vnbridles our
 appetites, and giues
 the onfet to all kind
 of vice.

Tempe- } Stupidity, the viter refusall
 rance } of all naturall necessary de-
 } lights; a fault so seldome, that
 } the Ancients could invent,
 } no name for it.

Aut Deus est, aut Truncus iners, qui nescit amare.

	Excesse	Sobriety	Defect.
In	{ Meites, Glutony.	{ meane.	{ Overmuch abstinence from necessary Meates Drinkes
	{ Drinkes, Drunkenesse		

Castitas { 1 Calibatus
 { 2 Coniugy.

Of Chastity.

Chastity is the containing of bodily lust to the vnmarried: moderateing of them to the married.

It is in { Mind.
 { Body.

The breach of it is not from the act only, but from the thought and affection of defiling.

The Integrity of mind and body is termed Virginity, the Queene of Vertues. If we abstaine in body but with reluctance of mind, it is termed Containing. A vertue ciuill, sith law cannot take hold of vs, but not full Morall.

Excesse. Meane Defect.

Inchastity in	{ 1 Words. 2 Gesture. 3 Actions. 4 Thoughts	{ Chastity	{ 1 Defrauding our bo- dys of pleasures law ful: This is vicious. 2 In none, but the married, which must not defraud one an- other.

It effecteth 3 things { 1 Diseases to the body.
 { 2 Deformities.
 { 3 Corruption to the mind.

XXXI. Of Content.

This vertue moderates the desire of wealth.

There are 2. parts of it { 1 A gratefull acceptance of our present estate
 { 2 Barring desires of more, then benefits our
 { vse. The

The propertyes of it are.

- 1 It breeds quietnes, and Tranquillity of minde.
- 2 It cannot be incident to fooles, and ambitious men.
- 3 It is a token of a good nature, and wise discretion to know sufficiency.
- 4 It is the truest riches, whereas the inioying of the greatest possessions with desire to get more, is the truest Pouerty.
- 5 It ventures not wealth in rash mispending, but keeps what is gotten with out feare, till occasion, and vse force him to spend.

Exceſſe	Meane	Defect
Covetouſnes, whoſe effects are 1.	A'v'la'q'uo	Neglect of our ſtate tem- porall.
1 A deſire of gaine. 2 It perſwades vs to all vice for the attaining it.		The effects hereof are 1. 1 Idlenes in our Voca- tion. 2 Extremity of Want.

XXXII. • *Modesty, and Magnanimity.*

Both these are conuertant about honour: The ground of them is deſert.

Their proprietyes. 3.

- 1 To ſue for honour deſerued.
- 2 To accept it offered.
- 3 To ſtand for his place, when his honour is deſeruedly yeilded to him.

Their difference.

Modesty is of lower, and leſſe honour, as our deſert is lower, and of leſſe things.

Magnanimity is for the moſt generous hart, to deſire the beſt, as his vertue is in ſupereminency aboue others.

Modesty hath theſe rules.

- 1 It argues, that both our ſelues and others haue fit approbation of our vertue.

- 2 It is resolute against carpers, and wrongfull imputers.
 3 It is humble in not acquiring further, then shall benefit vs.
 4 It shews { Words } either for { Wishing what we de-
 it selfe in { Gestures } the { serue.
 { Refusall of what we
 { deserue not.
 Defect.

Excesse	Meane	
Ambition	{ modesty }	{ Over-seruilenes cal'd <i>φιλοτιμία</i> . It a- riseth from Ignorance of our owne worth, not daring to shew our selues in the world.
hatched		
by pre-		
sumption }		

XXXIII Of Magnanimity.

Magnanimity is for the highest perfectiō. It aymes at the best honour, so (Whereas Honour is the repute of the Multitude) the perfection of it is greatst, when that repute is most transcendent and generall. Theence the person truly magnanimous must haue the whole fardle of vertues, that he may benefit all, that speake well of him, and hurt none to a voyd Ignominie.

The Adjunct of Magnanimity must be the highest place, and office.

The Rules are. 8.

- 1 The person haueing it counteth his honour receiued due vnto him both for others good, and his owne desert,
 2 He cares not for common censures.
 3 He rather giues then takes rewards.
 4 He remembers not Injuries.
 5 He is plyable to all sorts of persons, with satisfaction to them, and credit to himselfe.
 6 He admires { Words, } lieth he him- { Pleasure
 not others { Deeds, } selfe on { Occasion
 is able to doe the like.
 7 He is sparing in censuring others, yet liuing.

8 He

8 He puts not himselfe vpon voluntary dangers, yet vndergoes the vtmost, if it be put on him.

Excesse	Meane	Defect
Pride	Magnanimity	Puſillanimity, or vnſit, di- jection called <i>μειροψυχία</i>

Pride is in { 1 Vaunting our owne parts.
2 Suffering others to attribute more to vs then we deſerue.

It ariſeth from philauty.

It betrayes it ſelfe in { Words.
Geſture.
Apparell.

It hath theſe tenents. 5.

- 1 A proud man admireth none but himſelfe.
- 2 The way to abate him is to let him know, that wee ſcorne him.
- 3 He is vniuſt, as attributing all to himſelfe, and derogating from others.
- 4 It is moſt inclining, and moſt dangerous in falling.
- 5 It is hatefull in all, but deteſtable in poore folke.
Puſillanimity doth vndervalue our worth.
- The rules of it are. 4.
- 1 It is ingratitude towards God to receiue guiſts, and by our reſeruednes to leſſen them.
- 2 It makes other jealous of our parts, when we our ſelues diſtruſt them.
- 3 It is the mother of Idlenes.
- 4 It defrauds other, that may get by vs.

XXXIII *Of Fortitude.*

The Paſſions that ex- { 1 Care to, be rayſed.
ciſe this vertue are { 2 Boldnes to be repreſſed.
It is the ſidu- { Honour }
rance of Euill for { Honesty } ſake

Evills

Evills are { Internall from our selues, as Vices.
 { Externall, as dangers falling from without vs.
 1 The internall the most valiant ought to dread: his feare must be to nothing but sinne.

2 The eternall are { Prodigies.
 { 1 Extraordinary as { Strange { Lighnings } from
 { 2 Ordinary, and befalling in common. { Thunders &c. } God

1 The former none contemne, but { Atheists,
 { Fooles.
 { Madmen.
 2 The valiant mans vertue is only in contemning the latter.

2. euills ordinarie are { 1 Generall to all as, Death &c.
 { 2 Especiall, to some as { Exile.
 { Diseases.
 { Misfortunes.

Death is the principall object of fortitude, sith 'tis the most terrible of all other evils.

1 As barring vs from the exercise of all morall vertues: the vpsot of all goods.

2 As bereauing vs of all temporall commodities, the objects of our delights in this world.

All death is not properly the object of fortitude, but the most honourable, as dying in warre.

1 Sith it is with highest honour.

2 With most good to the publicke wealth.

The effects of fortitude are 3.

1 To triumph ouer our enemies.

2 To keepe our owne state quiet from the wrong of others.

3 To assure vs in extremityes.

--- *Aut cita mors venit, aut victoria laeta.*

The Incourages of this vertue are 5.

1 Words of cheering from the honourable, and wiser sort.

2 Examples of others shewing their words by their deeds.

3 Exercise

- 3 Exercise in skirmish.
- 4 Hope of reward; if not of spoyle, yet of Glory.
- 5 The Enimies weakenesse, and vnprovision.
The Tenents of Fortitude are 3.
- 1 The danger that it vndergoes must haue 3. Conditions.
 - 1 They must be honourably vndertaken; not on sud-
daine passion, or resolution.
 - 2 They must be in shew, that they may be commen-
ded by the weale publicke.
 - 3 They must not bee for priuate respects, but for
publicke.
- 2 The Valorous must not be stockish but haue some feeling
of wounds, yet voluntary he endures them for his ends sake.
- 3 It is not lawfull for him to kill himselfe, sith he doth it
for avoydance of further euill, which is cowardize, nam
--- *Timidi est optare necem, Ouid metam.*
- 5 sorts of men seeme to haue fortitude, yet haue not.
- 1 They that vnder- } on hope of reward for } As pressed
goe dangers only } feare of punishment. } Souldiers.
- 2 They that warre only, because they haue had experience
in the warre, and cannot shew their skill otherwise.
- 3 They that run to skirmish in hot blood.
- 4 They that ouercame often, and for hope of like successe
venture more,
- 5 They, that weigh not the extent of the danger, they are
soone resolute.

Excesse	Meane	Defect.
Rashnes of venturing		Cowardize. This grounds
this grounds most on	Fortitude	most on the passion of
the passion of boldnes		feare.

XXXV. Of Iustice.

Iustice is the mother, and foundresse of other Vertues: it is
in every constitution of state } Publicke.
 } Private.
 K

It is grounded in proportion and valuing.

It is either { Vniuersall comprehending all vertues.
 { Particular for { State,
 { some especiall { Person.

1 Vniuersall { Discretion to yeild each his due.
 2 parts { Obedience to the law.

The lawes { Written, *γραφοι*.
 are either { Vnwritten, *αγραφοι*.

1 The written are the positue { Law of { Nature.
 lawes of the land grounded { Nation.
 on the { Customs of places.

and they are { Publicke.
 { Priuate.

1 Publicke { Enacted by the whole state, as Statutes.
 { Proceeding from the King alone, as edicts, and
 { Proclamations.

2 Private is for speciall contract; as leases, bonds, deedes, and
 all which haue force of law.

2 The not-written is { Nature.
 the law of { Nations.

The precepts of this { 1 Liue honestly.
 Iustice are, *viz.* { 2 Wronge none.

{ 3 Yeild every man his right.

2 Particular { Distributue designe- { Office { accor-
 Iustice is. { ing to each man { Rewards, { ding to
 { { Punishments { desert.
 { 2 Commutative in matter of exchange, and
 { bargaine betweene man and man.

The breach { Former is fauour, an acception of persons,
 of the { *προσωποπισια*.
 { Latter, deceit.

4 things prevent { 1 Loue of mony.
 both kinds of Iustice { 2 Fauour to the person.
 { 3 Feare to displease great ones.
 { 4 Rancor, and malice.

Iustice

Iustice of distribution } Reward for the person deseruing.
considers 2 things. } Punishment for the person offending.

The objects of } Honour } to the good.
it are either } Reward }
 } Chastening to the bad.

Its tenent is.

It is not positieue but varies according to the quality of the person: As in any army all must haue their pay, but the capitaine more then the common Souldier: And it were iniustice to make them equall in reward, that are vnequall in desert. The like in punishments.

Excesse	Meane	Defect.
Injustice in dispensing } to vs about our desert	Iustice }	Injustice in yeilding vs lesse then our desert.

Both are termed Injury.

The excesse is Injury to others, and robbing them of their due, and bestowing on vs that deserue it not.

The defect is Injurie to our selues sith others can haue, and wee not.

The Rule of Injury is.

1 That it is suffered still with repining and vnwillingnes: thence a man cannot doe himselfe Injury, sith as he receiues the wrong, he is repining, and as he offers it, he is voluntary: And we cannot will and will at one time the same thinge.

Iustice of Exchange respecteth not the quality of the person but the worth of the thinge: It is principally in buying and selling and in all matters of contract.

This differs from the other, for this goes vpon quality (so much for somuch) that not: They are in trades, thus is Merchandize, the meane is mony.

In ancient time they vsed to giue wares for wares: afterwards they gaue Metals by weight for them. Now for more Convenience of portage they haue invented mony, to wit, metall in stampe and by it they exchange commodities.

The extreame in generall is vniust exchange.

Excesse	Meane	Defect,
When we sell for more then its worth	{ Iustice com- mutatiue	} when wee sell for lesse then it is worth.

In the former we wronge the buyer, and it is the greater fault; In the latter we wrong our selues, and it is more tolerable, sith our selues are the cause of it.

The meane rule for this Injustice is.

1 He is more in fault, that doth the wrong, then he that takes it, It was *Socrates* his saying. *Aul. Gell Noct. Att. l. 2. c. 9*

XXXVI Of Liberality, and Magnificence.

The Act of this Vertue is releiuing others wants, without prejudice to our owne.

Their dif- ference is	{ Liberality is for lesse gifts. Magnificence is for greater.
The Object of both is mony or mony-worth.	
Liberality is of lower abilities.	

In it are considered	{ End.	{ of giuing.
1. Conditions	{ Manner.	
The end on'y is to benefit others in honest sort.		

They that giue	{ 1 To receiue	{ Like	{ profit	{ are not counted liberall
	{ 2 Vpon ostentation.	{ Greater		
	{ 3 On long importuning and suite.	{ }		

The manner of giuing is bounded circumstances	{ 1 Who the	{ giver, receiuer,	{ is.
	{ 2 The time that the gift ought to come,	{ }	
	{ 3 The place where:	{ }	
	{ 4 The quality of it.	{ }	
	{ 5 The quantity of it.	{ }	

1 The Person must be	{ Freehearted to any.
	{ Wise to bestow on the worthiest.

1 Though

1 Though the receiuer be lewd, yet, if he be in pouerty, his pouerty makes him worthy of releife.

2 The time must be without pause. *Bis dat, qui cito dat.*

3 The place must be considered of

1 If we giue only for honesty sake, take a publike place, that others may witnesse it, sith fame is the Trumpet of Vertue.

2 If for pouerty and Almes blow no trumpet; a place of most privacy makes the giue most acceptable, *Ubicumq; est homo ibi beneficium locum est. Seneca.*

4 The quality must be such, that it be not to the hurt of the receiuer: it must rather be for profit, then for pleasure.

5 The quantity with moderation betweene either

} Too much.

} Too little.

drawne from consideration of the want of the receiuer, present vse of the giuer, that by giuing he not disfigureth himselfe for his owne imployments.

Excesse

Meane

Defect.

Prodigality in wasting a mans priuate estate

} Liberality

} Avarice, or Niggardize: this is willing to receiue all, giue not.

Avarice is worse then Prodigality.

1 It is further remoued from liberality, whose acte is in giuing, sith the niggard giues nothing and the prodigall giues too much.

2 The niggard defraudes both himselfe and others: The prodigall harmes himselfe only, and benefits others.

Magnificence is a Vertue only for great ones.

The Magnificent must be high aboue others in

1 Blood,
2 Office,
3 Vertue.

Excesse

Meane

Defect.

Riotous mispending.

The { End of it ostentatio
Cause { 1 Folly.
2 Neglect of our private estate.

} Magnificence

} Sordide Parsimony fearing to spend when Honour Necessity require

K 3 XXXVII Of

XXXVII. Of courtesy and Vrbanity.

His vertue shewes { Serious }
 it selfe in { Sporting } Conversation.

The acte of it is pleasure, and plyablenes of behauiour.

The End of { please others.
 it to { Demerit their good opinion.

It hath 2 parts { Easines of Accessse.
 { Slownesse to take offence.

The sterne to guide it is Gravity, least our affability turne to lightnes.

It was sayd of Cato Maior: *Erat in illo viro comitate condita granitas.*

The rules of it are 3.

1 It is most honourable in high persons.

2 It is Varied according to the circumstance of { Time.
 { Place.
 { Person.

3 It intends our { Owne Honesty.
 { Anothers profit.

For courtesy in serious matters the extreames are.

Excesse Meane Defect.

1 Popularity in great { Comitie { Morosity, as seeking
 ones. { neither to please any
 2 Soothing in the low- { in honest causes, nor
 er ranke. { be displeased by any.

Affability in sports is { Taking {
 called vrbanity for { Giuing { jests.
 Excesse Meane Defect.

Scurrility { Vrbanity { Rusticity making not able to giue,
 for abuse { not Willing to take jests.

XXXVIII. *Of Grace of Carriage.*

T His vertue makes } Reall for honesty.
not a man } But complementall.

Its rules } Generall }
are } Speciall } for fashion.

1 Generall. 7.

1 Goe cleanly in apparrell.

2 Keepe our body from loathfomnes.

3 Have a fit com- } Gesture, especially for } Head,
pouture of } Gate, and all with out affectation, and } Hands.
nicenes.

4 Have conveniencie } Fitnes of words.
of speech for } Discretion of reply.

Moderation of sound; } Over-loud.
that it be not. } Affected.
Harsh.

5 Barre } 1 Gesture.
insolent } 2 Shrikes in laughter; let not that be often, but
as occasion is offered : and that not so much ap-
prehended by vs, as the company also.

6 Use due reuerence to our betters, obseruance to strangers,
pleasure to our Acquaintance, Courtesy to our inferiors.

7 Take meate and drinke mannerly.

Speciall rules are had from consideration of each } Person.
Degree.
Quality.

Persons } 1 Sexe 2 yeares.
differ in } 3 Manners 4 Fortune.

Towards all our Carriage must be honest and pleasing.

1 Honest pleasure } Speech.
is made by } Gesture.

1 Twixt difference of sexe this be- } Little speakers not
hauour is requisite: women must be } forward for action.
Men must take vp the talke.

Their talke must } Learning.
be serious of } Not things sorrowfull, but of mirth,
and obvious passages.

Their gesture is learned by dancing.

2 Difference of yeares is either in-*sc.* } Youth.
Middle Age.
Old Age.

Wayes to be gracefull with younge.

1 They are soone angry: } Word } to rayse passion in
Crosse them not in } Deed } them

2 Enquire not of his faults: If a friend, tell him in priuate,
if a stranger, he scorneth thy rebuke.

3 Tell them of good hopes, and great adventures. Yong
men are credulous and confident: and if you perswade them
to the hope of a good, they will love you for it.

4 Our speech must rather be of pleasure, then profit.

5 Bee merry and jesting, and seeme to like of their com-
pany.

3 To be gracefull with old men } wayes.

1 Be not resolute in tenents discourfing with them: they
are soone testy, if they be crosse, and loue rather a yong man
doubtfull in controversies, then ouer-holding; sith they know
the hardnes of finding out a truth, and the earnestnes of youth
in holding a possible falshood.

2 They are suspicious, wee may not grow in too fast with
them, or force into their company.

3 Our speech must rather be of profit, then honesty, since
they are generally couetous.

4 Shew reuerence to age, not for fashion, but as spying some
sparkes of authority in their persons.

5 They are talkatiue, feed them with speech, but rather se-
cond them in their conceits, then to sift them from contradic-
tions, take heed of often replyes, they must rather be forced
by Question, then they proceed voluntarily. To

To aske them questions, save only of things necessary, and pertaining to themselves is against good manners.

The middle aged keepe an indifferent } Yong.
tenour betwixt both } Old.

Our way to be gracefull with them } Honesty, which likes
is to keepe the middle straine for } yong men.
Profit, which likes old
men.

Difference of manners is seene according to the difference
of passions and the way to behaue our selves in such a case is
from the observance of his } Passion. } which haue bin for-
} Age. } merly described.

Difference of fortune is seene in } Nobility of birth.
} Height of office.
} Riches.

Our beha- } Yielding in word, } this is most honest for
viour to these } Submission in body } vs.
must be } Assigning titles, } Pleasing for the n.

XXXIX. *Of Emulation.*

Æ Mulation stirs vs vp to Vertue and heartens vs to
Imitation.
The object of it is a good quality in others and at-
tainable by vs.

It is with greife, that others haue out-stript, and with hope
of over-taking them.

It differs from Envy; sith that is in the worst; this in the best
natures: *Licurgus* in *Sparta* commended it to youth, naming
it the nurse of Vertues.

In it selfe it is profitable, } Hate.
but in excesse rayses } Envy.

The parties most giuen to it are,

1 Yonge men, sith they are euer in rising.

L

2 They

2 They, who haue equality of $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Trades.} \\ \text{Professions.} \\ \text{Abilitys.} \end{array} \right\}$ as the Roman
 æmulates the *Athenian* the scholler, the *Carthaginian* the
 Merchant, &c.

3 They, who count themselves of worth, and hope to at-
 taine to as much perfection as another.

Excesse	Meane	Defect.
Indignation for anothers ri- sing.	Emulation	Abjection of mind, as not weighing, whether wee bee out stript or noe.

XL. Of Continency.

THIS is conversant a- $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Desires} \\ \text{Pleasures} \end{array} \right\}$ especi- $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Nourishment.} \\ \text{Venerly.} \end{array} \right\}$
 bout the restraint of

The difference betweene a continent and temperate man
 is: The temperate hath his passion of desire subdued within
 The continent not without foyle and reluctance; passion
 dwelling within like a dangerous Citizen: though stopt from
 rising, yet euer feared.

Hence Continency is not properly a vertue, sith passion is
 not brought to consent with reason: And Incontinence is not
 properly a Vice, sith it doth that fact, but in Iudgement con-
 demnes it.

The Intemperate doth it, $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Will is corrupted} \\ \text{Iudgment is blinded.} \end{array} \right\}$
 and approues it, sith his

The opposite of Continence is Incontinence:

The Incontinent before the act hath knowledge of what is
 right and fit to be done: in the Act he is carried by Passion,
 which blinds him that hee cannot applye that knowledge:
 After the Act he remembers the fault; and begins to repent.
 He falls into $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Heedlesnes, as not willing to forecast his dan-} \\ \text{ger,} \end{array} \right\}$
 this vice by

$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Infirmity, as not able to resist his Passion.} \end{array} \right\}$

Falls

Falls from infirmity are lesse curable, then falls of headines; sith the one comes from a debility of nature; the other but from an heat of Passion.

XLI. Of Patience.

THis differs from Fortitude, as Continence from Temperance: The Act of it is bearing of harmes, but with greife, and trouble of mind.

Hence it is noe perfect	{	with Ioy.	{	Defect.
Excesse		Voluntary.		
Stockish obduration: The Spartans vsed their children to it in beating them, yet not suffering them to lament.	{	Meane	{	Impatience: A womanish yielding to vnavoydable Evills.
		Patience		

XLII. Of the Heroicall Spirit.

THis riseth a degree of Eminence aboue the rest.

It differs from other vertues as heate from Warmth.

{	Of vnderstanding: so that famous lawgiuers and speciall sages are Heroicall.
	Of Grace, so Excellence of faith is Heroicall.
	Of Morall behaviour.

{	It is ground	{	Stronge compolure, & temperature of Body.
	ed on a.		Stronge compolure of mind.
{	It is set forth by 3 helpes	{	Many abilities for Action.
			Constancy of continuance.
			Prosperousnes of Successe.

The opposite of it is Sauagenes, A generall falling from all good duty without Iudgement to know, or will to wish the contrary.

These are the Catalogues of vertue. Vertue tempers Passion. Passion gets his meane from Wit, and Will: And these intend for their felicity.

Detur in offensa vitamihitangere metam.

Finis. Anno Domini: 1624. 9^o Decembris.

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